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High Expectations and Some Wounded Hopes:
The Policy and Politics of a Uniform Statute on
Videotaping Custodial Interrogations
Andrew E. Taslitz*
ABSTRACT
Much has been written about the need to videotape the entire process of police
interrogation of suspects. Videotaping discourages abusive interrogation techniques,
improves police training in proper techniques, reduces frivolous suppression motions,
and improves jury decision making about the voluntariness and accuracy of a confession.
Despite these benefits, only a small number of states have adopted legislation mandating
electronic recording of the entire interrogation process. In the hope of accelerating
legislative adoption of this procedure and of improving the quality of such legislation, the
Uniform Law Commission (ULC) ratified a uniform recording statute for consideration
by the states. I was the Reporter for this ULC effort. This Article focuses on the Act’s
most interesting and novel provisions: those affecting remedies for police failure to
record when required. The Act creates two remedies: suppression of confessions
rendered “unreliable” by the failure to record and a cautionary jury instruction. This
Article explains and defends both options. In addition, it challenges ULC’s choice to
exclude expert testimony as another remedial option. Furthermore, this Article defends
the Act’s exemption of police departments from civil liability if they enforce well-drafted
rules to promote the Act’s purposes. Ultimately, this Article concludes that, though the
Act is not perfect, from a policy perspective, it is an excellent step forward.

I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE NEED FOR, AND CONTENT OF, THE ACT: AN OVERVIEW
A. Need for the Legislation
1. Truth-finding
2. Systemic Efficiency
3. Constitutional Values
B. A Growing Consensus, Recognizing Reform’s Necessity
C. The Act’s Major Provisions Summarized
III. REMEDIES
A. Pretrial Suppression Motions
1. General Scope and Nature of this Remedy and of Its Justification
*

Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, American University,
Washington College of Law, Spring 2012; Professor, American University, Washington College of Law,
effective August 2012; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1981.

Vol. 7:2]

Andrew E. Taslitz

2.
3.

A Comparison to Other Jurisdictions in Greater Detail
The Act’s Approach to Suppression Redux: Unreliability as a Ground for
Pretrial Motions
i. The Remedy’s Relative Novelty
ii. Justifying Unreliabililty as a Stand-Alone Ground for Suppression
B. Jury Instructions and Their Relative Efficacy
1. The Virtues of Instructions Where Videotaping Inexcusably Fails to Occur
2. The Limitations of Sole Reliance on Instructions as a Remedy
C. Expert Testimony
IV. RULEMAKING
A. Monitoring and Guiding Police Performance
1. The Need for Rules Designed to Implement the Act
2. Delegation of Rulemaking Power Concerns: A Brief Note
B. Numbers of Cameras and Angle
C. Civil and Administrative Remedies and Their Linkage to Sound Rules
1. Internal Police Department Discipline of Its Officers
2. Limitation of Actions for Violation of the Act
V. CONCLUSION
APPENDIX

I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2010, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) sent to the fifty state
legislatures its proposed Uniform Electronic Recordation of Custodial Interrogations Act
(the Act). The Act sets out a framework requiring police to record the entire process of
interrogating suspects, from start to finish.1 The prevailing practice has been to record
only the confession itself, excluding the many hours of interrogation leading up to it, or
to rely upon written or un-taped oral confessions.2 Current practice has led to false
confessions, escape of the guilty for years, violations of constitutional rights, and
insufficient training in the most effective interrogation techniques—all this occurring
despite the diligent efforts of the largely well-meaning and experienced cadre of police
interrogators.3
Some police departments in the United States have voluntarily adopted
interrogation-recording procedures; some states have mandated these procedures by
statute or court decision. However, the vast majority of police departments still do not
record all interrogations.4 The hope of the Act’s drafters is that putting the prestige of the
1

See UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT (Unif. Law Comm’n, Draft 2010).
A copy of the UERCIA is provided in the Appendix.
2
See Thomas Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1128 (2005) (noting historical absence of recording the entire custodial
interrogation process).
3
See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 296–305 (2008) (summarizing the
benefits of recording).
4
See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1131–36 (discussing state legislation and judicial decisions); Alan M.
Gershel, A Review of the Law Requiring the Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 16 RICH. J. L. & TECH.
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ULC—best known as the author of the Uniform Commercial Code5—behind the
electronic recording process would accelerate its widespread national adoption, improve
uniformity, and improve the quality and efficiency by which interrogation occurs.6
Whether the Act achieves these goals will not be known for many years, as it must wend
its way through the cumbersome and highly political process of moving from proposal to
legislation in each state in which it is considered.
I was the Reporter for the Act, and this Article stems from that experience. I plan to
provide only the briefest summary of the Act’s core provisions. Those provisions,
mandating recording under specified circumstances, are unquestionably the main
motivation behind the Act.7 But they are neither unusual, nor add much to the scholarly
and political debate—with one exception: the sheer flexibility they give individual
jurisdictions to determine the scope of the mandate. This flexibility, combined with the
numerous exceptions to the mandate, should aid in overcoming political roadblocks to the
legislation.8
My focus, instead, will be on the Act’s remedial provisions and related rulemaking
sections,9 which do advance the debate in important ways.10 Specifically, the remedies
include an admittedly weak suppression option, but one that includes suppression not
only because a confession is involuntary but also because it is unreliable.11 Unreliability
is not a federal constitutional ground for suppression of confessions and is rarely a
statutory ground for doing so.12 Moreover, the prohibition against unreliable evidence
may provide a toehold for future development of a more general principle of the

9, 9–10 (2010) (“Over 500 jurisdictions [out of the tens of thousands of police departments] have now
enacted policies and procedures requiring their officers to record confessions in certain circumstances. At
present, seventeen states and the District of Columbia have enacted such requirements through the state
legislature, court decision, amendment to the state’s rules of evidence, or by court rules.”); Thomas
Sullivan, Departments That Currently Record a Majority of Custodial Interrogations (Apr. 4, 2011)
(unpublished study) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sullivan, Departments That Record].
5
The ULC’s website summarizes its mission and accomplishments. See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
www.nccusl.org (last visited June 30, 2011). The ULC was previously known as the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See id.
6
These were certainly the uppermost goals discussed in the drafting meetings that I attended. See also
UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT, Prefatory Note (Unif. Law Comm’n,
Draft 2010) (discussing goals of the uniform legislation).
7
See UERCI ACT § 3.
8
See infra text accompanying notes 66–104. Much of this Article necessarily draws on the ideas in the
Act’s commentary and expresses agreement with it because I drafted it. However, here, freed from my role
as Reporter, I also express significant disagreement with some aspects of the Act as a policy matter, if not
necessarily as a political matter. This Article also substantially expands upon the arguments made in the
commentary and the authority supporting them, focusing particular attention on the uniqueness and
importance of the remedial sections, which sections are far from the commentary’s primary concern.
9
See UERCI ACT §§ 13, 15–16.
10
Cf. THOMAS SULLIVAN, POLICE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS: CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION (2010)
(collecting similar regulations already implemented in a variety of police departments).
11
See UERCI ACT § 13(a); infra text accompanying notes 89–102. The “unreliability” provision is
bracketed, however, meaning that jurisdictions must consider whether to include it if they adopt the Act.
12
“Unreliability” is one motivating factor for creation of the due process test excluding involuntary
confessions. See infra text accompanying notes 175–192.
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reliability of any evidence that might otherwise raise an unacceptable risk of wrongful
conviction.13
The remedies also include a cautionary jury instruction where law enforcement has
failed, without a statutory excuse, to comply with recording mandates.14 Additionally, the
Act exempts from civil liability police departments that enforce properly drafted rules
promoting the Act’s purposes.15 I defend all of these remedial provisions and exemptions.
But, I also critique the Act’s failure to include an expert-testimony remedy. Too
many courts are highly skeptical of expert testimony on the factors affecting the
voluntariness and accuracy of confessions.16 The Act’s drafters considered but rejected
encouraging expert testimony on these factors as a remedy for unjustified nonrecording.17 That, I will argue, was a policy mistake, though perhaps an instance of
political wisdom.
Although my focus is on the content of these remedial provisions, I comment at
least briefly throughout this Article on the underlying politics. The drafting committee
and its many interest group (stakeholder) liaisons constituted a diverse lot, including
judges, defense attorneys, police officers, prosecutors, victims’ rights advocates, and a
host of other interested parties. Each group offered different perspectives—indeed,
perspectives often varying within each group. This diversity was intended by the ULC for
several reasons. First, it built political support by educating members that stereotypes
about groups’ views were often wrong. Skeptical officers, for example, gave more
credence to arguments from advocates who were fellow officers than from advocates who
were defense attorneys. Second, the diversity ensured, as much as is possible in a
politically charged debate, that the drafting committee had wide support among and
within many stakeholder groups. That support improves the chances for actual enactment
of the proposed legislation.
But, not every provision is, in my view, necessarily the best policy choice in a
theoretical, apolitical world. That reality disappointed some stakeholders, who may
criticize the Act for not doing enough. Nevertheless, even though the high expectations
that the proponents of change had for this Act have largely been met, the wounded hopes
of the most zealous of those advocates also deserve their due.

13

See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY:
REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE
INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 67–78 (2006) (discussing a wide range of tools, including
corroboration requirements, broadened discovery, and improved jury instructions for correcting the risk of
jailhouse snitch testimony from being unreliable).
14
See UERCI ACT § 13(b).
15
See id. at § 16(b).
16
See, e.g., State v. Cobb, 43 P.3d 855 (Kan. App. 2002) (concluding that expert testimony on false
confessions invades the province of the jury); State v. Davis, 32 S.W.3d 603 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000)
(similar, but also noting that cross-examination is a sufficient safeguard against error); People v. Rivera,
777 N.E. 2d 360 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 2001) (concluding that expert testimony on false confessions concerned
matters not yet “generally accepted”). But see Solomon Fulero, Expert Psychological Testimony on the
Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 247,
247–62 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) (discussing cases admitting such testimony, arguing that many more
are unreported, and arguing that courts are likely in the future to become more receptive).
17
See infra text accompanying notes 268–286.
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The next section of this Article, subpart IIA, briefly reviews why there is a need for
recording the entire custodial interrogation process. Subpart IIB, even more briefly,
summarizes the Act’s provisions. Part III delves into the major remedies provided by the
Act and those deleted from earlier drafts. Part IV elaborates further on the regulatory
provisions. Part V, the conclusion, summarizes the Article’s key points and offers
suggestions for the future.
II. THE NEED FOR, AND CONTENT OF, THE ACT: AN OVERVIEW
A. Need for the Legislation
The need for recording custodial interrogations in their entirety has three broad
justifications: promotion of truth-finding, efficiency, and constitutional values.18
1. Truth-finding
The truth-finding justification arises from the risk of convicting the innocent. In
just the past two decades, lawyers have documented hundreds of cases of wrongful
convictions that have been subsequently overturned.19 Most errors were proven by DNA
evidence.20 However, such evidence is not usually available.21 In some instances, the true
perpetrator continued to commit serious crimes while an innocent person languished in
prison.22 The cases have been sufficiently numerous and grave as to garner the attention
of the media, prosecutors, defense counsel, police, legislators, and law reformers.23 Some
of this attention has been fostered by investigation into the causes of mistakes, causes that
suggest that the proven cases of wrongful conviction are but the tip of the iceberg.24
Social science studies of wrongful convictions have demonstrated that one of the
most important contributors to error is the admissibility at trial of false confessions. 25
False confessions may often occur without police intending to do anything but convict
the guilty.26 Subtle flaws in interrogation techniques can elicit confessions by the
innocent.27 For example, lengthy interrogations; interrogations in which police “feed”
facts to the suspect that only the perpetrator could know, especially suggesting answers to
highly vulnerable suspects like the young or the mentally retarded; and, those in which
the police purport to have evidence of guilt (such as an eyewitness’s identification of the
18

See generally LEO, supra note 3, at 296–305 (elaborating on the justifications noted here).
See BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 5
(2011).
20
Id. at 6.
21
Id. at 11.
22
Id. at 3.
23
Id. at 6.
24
See generally BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2001) (outlining
what errors led to numerous wrongful convictions and leading others to research that same question with
greater intensity).
25
See LEO, supra note 3, at 291–96 (summarizing the history of the movement for electronic recording to
reduce the risk of false confessions).
26
See id. at 263–66 (explaining that tunnel vision can lead interrogators to believe in suspects’ guilt while
ignoring all other evidence).
27
Id. at 73.
19
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suspect at a staged lineup) all raise risks of the innocent confessing to crime.28 Police also
are poorly trained in how to spot liars, indeed relying on flawed indicators of lying, such
as a suspect’s averting his gaze or chewing on his fingernails.29 Yet the officers’
misplaced confidence in their lie-detecting abilities encourages them to use high-pressure
interrogation techniques, such as suspect-isolation, time-limited leniency offers, repeated
aggressive attacks on suspect guilt-denials, and aggressive confrontation.30 The
combination of these techniques with promises for leniency and other benefits upon
confessing or, conversely, threatened harms if the suspect refuses to confess fosters the
innocent to claim guilt.31 In some instances, police can even convince suspects that they
“must have” committed the crime even though they no longer remember doing so.32
Yet confessions are taken as such powerful evidence of guilt that prosecutors,
jurors, and judges often fail to identify the false ones.33 The resulting wrongful conviction
means not only that an innocent person is incarcerated but that a dangerous offender
continues threatening public safety.34 Thus the need for improving police training in
interrogation techniques that will reduce the risk of error and for improving prosecutor,
jury, and judicial effectiveness in spotting mistakes based upon false confessions is great.
However, defense and police witnesses often tell very different tales about the
degree of coercion involved in the interrogation process. This conflicting testimony may
also result in unnecessary confusion among judges or jurors, leading them to believe the
false confession rather than its later recantation.
Videotaping partly promotes truth-finding by reducing lying and deterring risky
interrogation techniques because police and suspects both know they are being watched.35
In addition, recording may allow detectives to focus their full attention on proper
interrogation techniques, improving the overall quality of the interrogation because it
frees them from the need to take notes.36 Recording allows supervisors to give feedback
on proper techniques, thereby improving training.37 Likewise, police and prosecutors are
able to review tapes to weed out suspect cases before they reach juries that may believe
false tales rather than impugn honest officers.38 Finally, fact finders are better able to do
their job because the recording can refresh witness memories and provide a more
complete and accurate picture of the full course of events.39

28

See id. at 140–48, 201–04, 210–11, 216–19, 229–35; WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING
PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PROCESSES AFTER DICKERSON 182–83, 203–15 (2001).
29
LEO, supra note 3, at 226–39.
30
See id. at 236.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 216–17. Detectives explain to the suspects that blackouts or multiple personality disorders caused
loss of memory of the heinous act. Id. at 218.
33
See Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions, 73 ALB. L. Rev 1227, 1230–31 (2010).
34
LEO, supra note 3, at 268.
35
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1129.
36
LEO, supra note 3, at 297.
37
Id. at 297.
38
Lisa Lewis, Rethinking Miranda: Truth, Lies, and Videotape, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 199, 222 (2008)
(discussing weeding out false confession cases); LEO, supra note 3, at 296–305 (discussing fact finder
reluctance to impugn honest officers’ ability to interrogate properly).
39
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1129.
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2. Systemic Efficiency
Recording fosters systemic efficiency by reducing the number of frivolous
suppression motions or aiding in quick motion resolution whenever a defendant’s version
of events is contradicted by the recording.40 Although the interrogation process may be
lengthy, showing selected portions of the video that are squarely contrary to the suspect’s
testimony takes little time and may discourage lengthier parades of witnesses called
merely to challenge police officer credibility.41 In addition, prosecutor bargaining power
may be enhanced for the same reason, thus likely promoting more guilty pleas.42 By
resolving factual doubts, recording would also make hung juries less likely.43 Police able
to review a recording for the subtleties of body language and of suspect comments may
also better pick up on avenues for investigation or reasons to confirm or dispute a
defendant’s story, thus quickening the time needed for investigation.44 Video-recording
the entire interrogation process is, admittedly, so new that no empirical studies have been
done on whether these predicted benefits have actualized. But, the high levels of
satisfaction among law enforcement in jurisdictions that have been recording are
consistent with these predicted efficiencies.45
3. Constitutional Values
The recording of interrogations protects U.S. constitutional values better by
improving suppression motion resolution accuracy and police training.46 The United
States Constitution’s due process and self-incrimination clauses embody a complex set of
values relevant to custodial interrogations.47 These values include avoiding coerced or
compelled confessions, protecting the innocent, and barring certain harsh interrogation
techniques as simply fundamentally unfair regardless of the suspect’s guilt.48 When fact
finders make mistakes, such as believing that no conduct violative of constitutional
40

LEO, supra note 3, at 297–98.
This option of selecting only portions of the video to use at trial or in suppression hearings was noted by
some members of the drafting committee and its liaisons during internal discussions. See also Tracy Lamar
Wright, Let’s Take Another Look at That: False Confession, Interrogation, and the Case for Electronic
Recording in Idaho, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 251, 276–77 (2007) (“When one considers the many time and cost
saving advantages of recording, including fewer pretrial motions to suppress based on claims of coercion,
‘protection of officers against claims of abuse,’ stronger evidence resulting in more guilty pleas, and
elimination of the need for extensive testimony, it becomes clear why overburdened police departments,
prosecutors, and judges would embrace the technique.”).
42
Thomas P. Sullivan, Police Experiences with Recording Custodial Interrogations, 88 JUDICATURE 132,
135 (2004).
43
LEO, supra note 3, at 298.
44
Id. at 298.
45
See WILLIAM A. GELLAR, POLICE VIDEOTAPING OF SUSPECT INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF ISSUES AND PRACTICE 115–19, 132–33, 141–42 (Nat’l Instit. of Justice
1992) (noting that all participants in a survey of departments voluntarily choosing to videotape the entire
interrogation process found that videotaping saved total officer case time); Wright, supra note 41, at 276–
77 (summarizing the recent surveys of police departments videotaping the entire interrogation process).
46
Id. at 299.
47
See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, MARGARET L. PARIS & LENESE A. HERBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 660–62, 667–68, 670–81, 692–94 (4th ed. 2010) (summarizing and analyzing these values).
48
See id.
41
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mandates occurred when it did, these values are undermined.49 Empirical data shows that
jurors exhibit a heightened ability to differentiate true from false, coerced from voluntary,
confessions where the entire custodial interrogation process has been taped.50 Such values
are also fostered because the wide availability of a largely indisputable record of what
occurred in the interrogation room should act to deter governmental overreaching and to
expose it when it occurs.51 Recording makes it easier for the state to preserve potential
exculpatory evidence and to provide it to defense counsel, thus improving compliance
with notions of the due process obligation to produce exculpatory evidence for the
defense.52 A recording could reveal racial bias and encourage means for correcting it and
can, given the above advantages, promote law enforcement legitimacy by improving its
public accountability.53 Indeed, there are empirical grounds for believing that police often

49

See WHITE, supra note 28, at 190–95.
See Saul M. Kassisn et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW. &
HUM. BEHAV. 3, 27 (2000); G. Daniel Lassiter & Andrew L. Geers, Bias and Accuracy in the Evaluation of
Confession Evidence, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 197, 208–09 (G. Daniel
Lassiter ed., 2005). My purpose here is not to offer a comprehensive defense of the benefits of recording or
a complete review of the empirical literature. Rather, I am trying here to summarize the defenses and
literature sufficiently to enable the reader to appreciate the importance of the remedial question to follow.
51
See LEO, supra note 3, at 299. Deterrence and improved accuracy are more generally thought to be
among the benefits of more transparent policing. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 1107 (2000); Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities
for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 64–65 (2010).
52
LEO, supra note 3, at 300. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), recognized the prosecutor’s due
process obligation to produce material exculpatory evidence to the accused. That obligation extends to
evidence whose only relevance is impeaching prosecution witnesses on material points. See United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (first so holding); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155 (1972)
(concluding that exculpatory evidence included evidence demonstrating witness’s pro-prosecution bias).
Evidence is material if there is a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The prosecutor
also has a due process obligation affirmatively to learn of exculpatory evidence possessed by the police or
civilian investigators. See Kyles v. Whiteley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). Ethical rules impose a similar,
though not identical, obligation on prosecutors to produce exculpatory evidence to the defense. See A.B.A.
MODEL R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.8(d) (2010) (requiring a prosecutor to “make timely disclosure to the defense
of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense.”).
53
See, e.g., Cynthia J. Nadjadowski, Explaining Racial Disparities in False Confession Rates, AM.
PSYCHOL. L. SOC’Y NEWS, Summer 2011, at 6–11 (discussing the role of racial stereotype threat in leading
to false confessions); Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Risk Factor in Convicting the
Innocent?, 4 OHIO ST. CRIM. L. 121 (2006) [hereinafter Taslitz, Wrongly Accused] (discussing some data
and the likely processes by which unconscious racial bias can contribute to false confessions); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Prosecuting the Informant Culture, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1081–90 (2011) (discussing
importance of police accountability and transparency and its connection to procedural justice and perceived
law enforcement legitimacy). A recent study also raises the prospect that jurors viewing audio-visual
electronic recordings of white officers interrogating black suspects will be biased against the suspect even
if proper camera angles are used. See Jennifer J. Ratcliff et al., The Hidden Consequences of Racial
Salience in Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 200, 213–14
(2010). These authors recommend having interrogators and suspects matched by race to avoid this racial
disparity effect. The research seems to me to be in too early a stage, however, to consider such a measure,
especially given the cost of doing so in departments lacking racial diversity sufficient to permit routine
racial-matching.
50
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use harsher interrogation techniques with suspects belonging to racial minorities.54
Although the evidence suggests that such racial disparities occur via subconscious
processes—thus, not violating equal protection prohibitions against intentional
discrimination55—many commentators support a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause that would reach such subconsciously motivated disparities.56
B. A Growing Consensus, Recognizing Reform’s Necessity
For just these reasons, many academics have recommended,57 and several states
have statutorily mandated,58 electronic recording of the entire custodial interrogation
process. For example, Illinois, the District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska,
New Mexico, North Carolina, and Wisconsin have adopted mandatory recording laws for
a variety of felony investigations.59 Alaska, Massachusetts, and Minnesota have
recording requirements imposed by judicial decision.60 The New Jersey and Indiana
Supreme Courts have, likewise, required recording via court rule.61 A significant number
of state courts have declared that recording would have powerful benefits for the justice
system, but have declined to impose that obligation absent legislative action.62
The military has also begun embracing the recording ideal. For example, the United
States Naval Criminal Investigative Service (USNCIS) Manual now contains General
Order 00-0012, which requires video or audio recording of suspect interrogations of
crimes of violence where the interrogation takes place in a USNCIS facility.63 Similarly,
in October 2009, the Commission on Military Justice, known as the Cox Commission,
released a report concluding that principles of justice, equity, and fairness require
“military law enforcement agencies to videotape the entirety of custodial interrogations
of crime suspects at law enforcement offices, detention centers, or other places where
54

See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused, supra note 53, at 126–32.
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that plaintiffs may not even obtain
discovery in a case claiming intentional selective racial prosecution in violation of the United States
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause without first independently proving that law enforcement failed to
proceed against similarly situated white offenders).
56
See Charles W. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
57
See generally, Wright, supra note 41.
58
See infra text accompanying notes 50–51.
59
See Thomas P. Sullivan & Andrew W. Vail, The Consequences of Law Enforcement Officials’ Failure to
Record Custodial Interviews as Required by Law, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 215, 216–17 (2009).
60
See id.
61
See id. at 217; see Order Amending [Indiana] Rules of Evidence, [Rule 617], No. 94S00-0909-MS-4
(filed Sept. 15, 2009) (requiring, subject to seven narrow exceptions, audio and video recording of custodial
interrogations in all felony prosecutions); Gershel, supra note 4, at 4 (referencing a complete list of states
that have enacted recording laws, whether by statute, rule, or judicial decision, including New Jersey and
Indiana, as of 2010).
62
See, e.g., Sullivan & Vail, supra note 59, at 216–17 n. 8; See generally Gershel, supra note 4
(summarizing case and other law implementing or rejecting a recording mandate); State v. Hajtic, 724
N.W. 2d 449, 456 (Iowa 2006) (encouraging but not requiring electronic recording); People v. Geno, 683
N.W. 2d 687, 690 (Mich. App. 2004) (rejecting purported state constitutional recording mandate and
leaving the decision to the legislature).
63
See U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, General Order 00-0012, Policy Change Regarding
Recording of Interrogations.
55
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suspects are held for questioning, or, where videotaping is not practicable, to audiotape
the entirety of such custodial interrogations.”64 The Air Force Judge Advocate General’s
Corps also declared that it would start recording all subject interviews as of October
2009, though there are limited exceptions, and recording of witness and victim interviews
is optional.65 Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,
in § 1080, requires that “each strategic intelligence interrogation” (one conducted in a
“theater-level detention facility”) of persons in the custody of, or under the control of, the
Department of Defense (DOD) shall be “videotaped or otherwise electronically
recorded.”66 The section requires the Judge Advocate General to develop implementing
guidelines.67
A significant number of police departments have also voluntarily adopted the
recording solution.68 No comprehensive study has been done yet of why these
departments have done so. Anecdotally, however, the reasons seem to vary from
enlightened local police leadership convinced of the benefits of recording or seeking to
preempt legislative or judicial action, to prestigious local figures embracing the cause, to
the embarrassment created by infamous revelations of mistaken convictions.69 Yet the
vast majority of police departments still do not record.70 There are wide variations among
the voluntarily adopted programs.71 Departments vary in what crimes are recorded,
whether recording is only audio or also visual, and at what locations recording must be
made.72 Furthermore, some approaches—for example, those addressing proper camera
angles, providing for internal police rulemaking, and clearly addressing appropriate
sanctions—promise to be more effective in protecting the innocent, convicting the guilty,
minimizing coercion, and avoiding frivolous suppression motions than others, for reasons
to be explained shortly.73 Additionally, the spread of the recording process throughout
64

See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MILITARY JUSTICE 3 (Oct. 2009) (also known as the “Cox
Commission Report”).
65
See Sullivan, Departments That Record, supra note 4, at 8 n. 25.; Maj. Lynn Schmidt, USAF, AFOSI
Begins Recording Subject Interviews, THE REPORTER [OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS],
Summer 2010, at 19 (summarizing the policy and its implementation, including potential exceptions).
66
Sullivan, Departments That Record, supra note 4, at 8 n.26.
67
See id.
68
See Sullivan & Vail, supra note 59, at 228–234 (listing all such departments, a list encompassing
departments in forty states who have voluntarily adopted recording; when the states that have mandated
recording are added, all fifty states plus the District of Columbia have at least one police department
engaged in recording in at least some cases).
69
These anecdotes were shared among members of the drafting committee for the Act. See also Aviva
Orenstein, Facing The Unfaceable: Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in Postconviction Cases of Actual
Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401 (2011) (offering structural and psychological reasons why some
prosecutors resist admitting that they have convicted the innocent); DAVID A. HARRIS, FAILED EVIDENCE:
WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE ch. 6, 39–50, ch. 7 (NYU Press, forthcoming Fall 2012) (draft
manuscript) (discussing specific cases in which innocence reforms came about and how they did so and
stressing the importance of enlightened leadership).
70
See Courtney A. Lawrence, Criminal Law: Too Much of A Good Thing: Limiting the Scope of the Scales
Recording Requirement to Custodial Interrogations Conducted in Minnesota-State v. Sanders, 37 WM.
MITCHELL L REV. 325, 331 (2010) (elucidating the history of electronic recording).
71
Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1131 (2005).
72
See id. at 1133.
73
See infra text accompanying notes 289–323.
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states and localities has been slow when its promised benefits are great.74 A uniform
statute may help to speed up and standardize informed resolution of the recording issue.
It was in recognition of these needs that the ULC, after a two-year-long drafting process,
promulgated the Act that is the subject of this Article.75
C. The Act’s Major Provisions Summarized
The complete Act is attached to this Article as an Appendix. Here I provide only
the most cursory summary of the Act that is necessary to understanding the discussion of
its remedial principles that follows.
The Act leaves individual jurisdictions free to decide the crimes to which, and the
locations at which, the recording requirement applies.76 Jurisdictions are similarly free to
decide whether recording must be by audio or also by video, including freedom to require
audio only in some locations, audio and video in other locations.77 Whatever choices
jurisdictions make on these matters, however, the requirement kicks in only for
“custodial” interrogations, as currently defined by Miranda and its progeny.78 In its
rulemaking provisions, the Act also includes a requirement of explaining why recording
was done outside a specified location, if a jurisdiction chooses to limit the recording
mandate only to certain spaces.79 Even though the Act assumes that at least some
custodial interrogations will be recorded and seeks to encourage expanding recording’s
use wherever feasible, the scope of the mandate remains in the individual jurisdiction’s
hands.
This degree of flexibility might seem to undermine the Act’s uniformity goals.
However, the Act’s drafting committee believed that recording in some instances is better
than recording in none80 and that experiences with recording are likely to be so positive,
and costs so likely to decline over time, that jurisdictions will choose to expand
recording’s use widely, even if they initially choose to employ it stingily.81 This gradual
expansion of the technique’s use would promote greater trans-jurisdictional uniformity

74

See Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1140 (stating that there is much opposition to expansion, especially from
those that who benefit the most from its creation—the police.)
75
See UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT (Unif. Law Comm’n, Draft 2010).
76
See id. at § 3.
77
See UERCI ACT.
78
See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (defining “custody”); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 421 (1984) (concluding that an ordinary traffic stop does not place the driver in “custody”);
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (defining “interrogation”); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning
Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519 (2008) (arguing that the Court’s recent interpretation of Miranda has
gutted its protections and that police training manuals support this conclusion); Yale Kamisar, On the
"Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929,
934 (1995) (arguing more than a decade ago that the Court was eviscerating Miranda).
79
UERCI ACT § 3(d).
80
Again, I am familiar with the thinking of many of the drafting committee members because of
conversations in which I participated through my role as Reporter. I do not claim, however, that every
committee member or liaison shared the same reasons for voting in favor of particular provisions.
81
This latter belief stemmed from the uniformly positive reviews of recording from law enforcement in
jurisdictions using it. See Wright, supra note 41, at 276–77; Sullivan, supra note 42, at 133-135.
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over time.82 Furthermore, the Act includes numerous exceptions to cover a wide range of
potential complications.83 On the political front, drafters considered the flexibility
provided by the slow, incremental changes permitted by the Act likely to improve the
chances of widespread adoption.84 States fearing high costs, for example, could choose
narrow application, while those persuaded by the argument that any minimal out-ofpocket costs would be far outweighed by long-term benefits could choose broader
application.85
III. REMEDIES
The more unusual and interesting provisions of the Act, however, are those
involving remedies and regulations. The Act provides for two remedies if violated. First
among these is a very limited suppression remedy86 and second cautionary jury
instructions.87 In both instances, the Act again provides jurisdictions substantial freedom
of choice.88 The Act also protects against civil liability as a remedy if certain regulations
are adopted and enforced.89 This part of this Article discusses each of these remedies, as
well as a remedy ultimately excluded from the Act, expert testimony on the factors
contributing to false confessions and the benefits of videotaping the entire interrogation
process. Details on the required regulations to avoid civil liability are left to a later
section of this Article regarding the Act’s provisions on rulemaking.
A. Pretrial Suppression Motions
The drafting committee engaged in its most heated discussion over the potential for
suppressing evidence as a remedial measure. The theory behind a suppression remedy
was that it would provide a strong incentive for compliance with the Act.90 Moreover, it
would help to avoid wrongful convictions by excluding evidence of doubtful
82

This belief of course remains an optimistic informed speculation until a variety of jurisdictions adopt the
Act, permitting its effects to be observed over time.
83
UERCI ACT §§ 5–10.
84
Drafting committee liaison Thomas Sullivan was perhaps the strongest advocate of this position in
drafting committee discussions. See also Sullivan & Vail, supra note 59, at 220–27 (dropping mandatory
suppression as a remedy and proposing a model statute with many exceptions and other flexibility based on
the theory that less flexibility would prompt political resistance to change and that law enforcement, once
actually doing recording, will enthusiastically embrace the procedure’s widespread use).
85
The discussion here is of the drafting committee’s perceptions of jurisdictions considering adopting the
Act but that have not yet adopted any mandatory recording procedures. As discussed earlier, there is reason
to believe that wider coverage of recording mandates will reduce overall costs to the justice system, an
analysis that looks beyond initial out-of-pocket costs to start up a recording system. See supra text
accompanying notes 48–53.
86
UERCI ACT § 13(a).
87
Id. at § 13(b).
88
Id. at § 13(a)-(b).
89
Id. at § 16(b).
90
Id. at §13(a) (creating modest suppression remedy). I am reporting here on the internal debates held in
the ULC drafting committee. See also Christopher Slobogin, Transnational Law and Regulation of the
Police, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC.. 451, 455 (2006) (arguing that a properly designed combination of civil
penalties and administrative action aimed at individual officers would achieve far better deterrence than do
exclusionary rules but conceding that we currently have no such system).
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trustworthiness, or at least evidence whose trustworthiness could not fairly be evaluated
by the fact finder.91 Additionally, the Act’s exceptions were so numerous and covered
every legitimate reason for not recording (even including a catchall “exigent
circumstances” exception)92 that exclusion would be rare and, when it occurred, would
likely involve either intentional wrongdoing or extreme negligence, making suppression
fully justifiable.93
Opponents of the suppression remedy, however, argued that there are already
constitutional grounds for excluding involuntary confessions.94 Furthermore, in their
view, voluntary confessions are still trustworthy, meaning that they are unlikely to create
an unacceptable risk of convicting the innocent.95 To the extent that trustworthiness is in
doubt, they saw cautionary jury instructions as an adequate corrective.96 Opponents
viewed exclusion as a harsh sanction, particularly where the police have done no
“wrong,” that is, not engaged in tactics sufficiently coercive to overcome the accused’s
will. Furthermore, the constitution provides other remedies for suppressing confessions
that are not involuntary, including violation of the Miranda warnings and the right to
counsel.97 In their opinion, to add another independent ground for suppression seemed
like overkill.
To address opponents’ concerns, the Act does not create an independent ground for
suppression stemming from the failure to comply with the Act’s recording requirements.
It does declare that its violation may be considered as a relevant factor in determining
voluntariness.98 The Act also suggests, in brackets,99 that jurisdictions should adopt a
provision permitting suppression based upon a confession’s unreliability—that is, where
there is serious reason to doubt its accuracy in its essential points—even if there is no
91

See infra text accompanying notes 167–232.
UERCI ACT §§ 5–10.
93
The United States Supreme Court has also applied the suppression remedy stingily in another area of
constitutional criminal procedure: the Fourth Amendment. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring:
Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 671 (2011). The Court has
held that suppression of evidence is wise for intentional or grossly negligent violations of law by individual
officers or for systemic negligence. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); Andrew E. Taslitz,
The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76
MISS. L.J. 483 (2006) (explaining the theory behind the Court’s drift toward a deliberate action/gross
negligence standard for suppression under the exclusionary rule); Davis v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2419
2011 U.S. LEXIS 4560, *19–20 (2011) (declaring that exclusionary rule applies under the Fourth
Amendment only to deliberate or grossly negligent police conduct).
94
See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 657–62, 670–86 (summarizing the most important of
these remedies).
95
This is a debatable point. Much social science suggests that confessions can be unreliable even when
obtained via methods not involving “coercion” or not “overcoming the will” as those terms are apparently
defined by the Court under the due process clauses. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions:
Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010).
96
See infra text accompanying notes 233–236 (discussing the virtues and vices of the jury instruction as a
remedy).
97
See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 694–732, 787–809 (summarizing the relevant case
law).
98
UERCI ACT § 13(a).
99
Bracketing language is the ULC’s mechanism for indicating that the language is suggested but optional.
Id.
92
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coercive police conduct.100 Under that language, the inexcusable failure to record may tip
the scale, when combined with other circumstances, to suppressing the confession
because it was involuntarily given or unreliable but not simply because it was unrecorded
or improperly recorded.
Among the virtues of this approach is its increased likelihood of gaining political
support due to the opposing positions on suppression discussed above. It is, however, a
remedy that still turns on a trial judge’s weighing of numerous circumstances, allowing
trial judges to retain enormous discretion.101 Where judges have such discretion, they
rarely suppress, except in the most unusual or extreme of cases.102 Furthermore, as noted
above, it is hard to violate the Act due to its many exceptions.103 If this point is
understood and accepted, that too should aid in convincing jurisdictions to adopt the Act.
But the approach has vices too, arising precisely from the likely rarity of suppression in
practice.104 Ultimately, the approach is a wise compromise, not a perfect ideal.
1. General Scope and Nature of this Remedy and of Its Justification
Generally, exclusion is understood as a remedy turning on a cost-benefit
analysis.105 Among the primary social benefits of an exclusionary remedy for violation of
this Act’s electronic recording mandate are deterring future violations, protecting
accuracy in fact-finding, protecting against false confessions occurring in the first
place,106 and adding a statutory layer of protection to other relevant constitutional rights,
such as the due process right to be free from coercive interrogations107 and the Fifth
Amendment right to be free from compelled custodial interrogations, including the

100

See id.
See id.
102
Michael D. Pepson & John N. Sharifi, Lego v. Twomey: The Improbable Relationship Between an
Obscure Supreme Court Decision and Wrongful Convictions, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1185, 1191–92, 1242
(2010) (suggesting that judicial discretion, combined with a low preponderance of the evidence burden of
proof, likely guarantees frequent denial of motions to suppress confessions).
103
See supra text accompanying notes 81–87.
104
See Pepson & Sharifi, supra note 102, at 1242; infra text accompanying notes 131–148.
105
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (subjecting availability of an exclusionary remedy under
the Fourth Amendment to a cost-benefit analysis).
106
Deterrence is always one justification for exclusionary rules. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra
note 47, at 616–17; Slobogin, supra note 90. Here, exclusion promotes fact-finding accuracy because it
keeps confessions from the jury where we lack the best evidence of the confession’s truthfulness, namely,
the electronic recording, and under circumstances where the absence of recording is not excused and is,
therefore, especially troubling. See supra text accompanying notes 81–92. The improved training that
recording promotes is one among several reasons why recording helps to reduce false confessions in the
first place. See supra text accompanying notes 36–38. Exclusion of inexcusably untaped confessions sends
the message that sloppiness or negligent or intentional behavior insulating interrogators from review and
accountability for their tactics will not be tolerated. See supra text accompanying notes 33–47; TASLITZ,
PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 600–04 (discussing Court’s recent focus on individual police officer
culpability and departmental systemic negligence as justifications for applying the exclusionary rule); Erik
Luna, supra note 51 (recounting the virtues of “transparency” in improving police accountability,
something that, I note here, taping would do as well).
107
See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 657–81.
101
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Miranda prophylactic protection of that right.108 But where violation of the Act has only
minimally implicated these social interests, the cost of suppression may not be worth the
benefits. Therefore, the Act merely requires the trial court to consider the relevance and
weight of violation of the electronic recording mandate in pretrial suppression motion
decisions.109
Although the Act does not, therefore, mandate exclusion of evidence as a remedy, it
does recognize, in subsection 13(a), that the failure to comply with the terms of the Act
may be considered relevant in resolving a motion to suppress a confession on other
grounds, including (but not limited to) doing so on the grounds of its involuntariness or
unreliability.110 In doing so, this Act navigates among the inflexible rule of per se

108

Miranda is said to be a “prophylactic” rule in that it provides protection for the core privilege against
self-incrimination in circumstances in which, absent the Miranda rule, a violation of the privilege itself
would not necessarily always be found. See id. at 712–17.
109
Statutory mandates for decisionmakers to consider factors without requiring that they thereby decide a
particular way are not impermissibly vague. For example, one well-known statute was unsuccessfully
challenged as violating free speech rights in NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). There, the amended
statute governing the National Endowment of the Arts (NEA) directed the NEA chairperson, in establishing
procedures for determining the artistic merit of grant applications, to “take into consideration general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs of the American public.” Id. Several grantapplicants denied funding sued the NEA on several First Amendment grounds, only one of which, undue
vagueness (which is also a due process concept), is relevant here.
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the statute did indeed not mandate any particular
outcome. But the Court rejected the claim that if the mandate to “consider” a factor does not require a
particular result on the statute’s face, that renders the statute so impermissibly vague and subjective as to
allow the agency to be thoroughly unconstrained, permitting invidious discrimination to occur below the
radar. A mandate to “consider” a factor is no more vague, however, concluded the Court, than the ultimate
question to which this consideration contributed to an answer: whether the grant application was for a
project that was likely to exemplify “artistic excellence.” Only a case-by-case consideration of a wide array
of information could lead to a decision on such a question in an individual case.
The Act discussed in this Article uses similar “consideration” language to that in Finley, creating no
greater ambiguity than in that decision. The Act does direct its mandates to a court, rather than, as is in
Finley, an administrative agency. But changing the recipient of the legislative directive does not alter the
clarity or meaning of the statutory language. Legislative mandates for courts to “consider” certain factors in
making case-specific judgments are indeed common. See, e.g., Tracey Bateman, Divorce and Separation:
Consideration of Tax Consequences in Distribution of Marital Property, 9 A.L.R. 5th 968, § 2(a) (1993)
(some states have statutes requiring courts “to consider” tax consequences in determining the distribution
of marital property in divorce proceedings); Christina A. Weatherford, Judicial Sentencing Discretion PostBooker: Are Judges Getting a Distorted View Through the Lens of Social Networking Sites?, 27 GA. ST. L.
REV. 673, 681–82 (2011); cf. 2 PUB. NAT. RESOURCES § 17:3 (George Cameron Coggins & Robert L.
Glicksman eds., 2d ed. 2011) (explaining that certain federal statutes require agencies to consider
alternatives to recommend courses of action without mandating that agencies necessarily adopt those
alternatives); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a Decision?, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 67 (2009) (discussing when an agency must, may, and cannot consider certain factors in
making a decision).
110
UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT § 13(a) (Unif. Law Comm’n, Draft
2010). Stating that the unjustified lack of recording should be “considered”—the unbracketed language of
the Act—leaves the precise weight to be given Act violations undefined. This imprecision might suggest
that a trial judge should be free to give the lack of recording decisive weight. Some jurisdictions may trust
the trial court to make precisely just such decisions as among those commonly made in pretrial motions.
For jurisdictions seeking to make it clear, however, that nonrecording should never alone be sufficient to
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exclusion in some states, the presumed inadmissibility in other states, the overly complex
balancing approaches recommended by some law reformers, and the complete
abandonment of even the possibility of an exclusionary remedy in one state.111
As mentioned above, the most likely grounds for suppression are that the accused
gave his statement involuntarily,112 that it was unreliable,113 or that it violated
Miranda.114 The Act emphasizes the first two grounds as most relevant and important,
where the need for recording is at its highest,115 but it uses the word “including” to
acknowledge that other federal and state constitutional, and in states which have specified
additional statutory, grounds may become relevant for suppression in a case where a
police officer fails to record an interrogation.116 Where this occurs, however, unjustified
non-recording would still need to be “considered” in the pretrial motion but would not
necessarily result in exclusion of the evidence. Even the possibility of non-recording’s
being a consideration in suppression motions generally arises only when Miranda
warnings would also be required (the existence of a “custodial interrogation” being a
necessary trigger for the Act’s provisions),117 the offense is one covered by this Act (in
most states, this is likely initially to be a relatively small subset of all crimes), and one of
the Act’s extensive set of exceptions does not apply. That is likely to be the unusual case,
albeit an important situation in which the exclusionary possibility should be
contemplated.118
justify exclusion, bracketed language declares that the trial judge may consider exclusion as only “a factor”
in the suppression balancing analysis.
111
See infra text accompanying notes 149–166 (summarizing these approaches).
112
See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (comparing Miranda and involuntariness
suppression grounds); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (explaining scope of involuntariness
as a ground for suppression). Both involuntariness and Miranda are constitutional grounds for suppression.
113
Unreliability alone is a statutory, not a federal constitutional, ground for suppression. See infra text
accompanying notes 175–232.
114
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Oregon, 470 U.S. at 318 (applying Miranda).
115
The drafting committee’s thought was that Miranda can be violated under circumstances in which a
confession is both voluntary (because the Fifth Amendment privilege that underlay Miranda requires only
“compulsion,” which is something less than “coercion” creating involuntariness) and reliable. See also
TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 47 at 708–12 (comparing compulsion with voluntariness).
116
See, e.g., 1 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 27:32 (2010) (explaining the federal “McNabb/Mallory” rule,
codified and modified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501, permitting suppression of confession evidence for unreasonable
delay in preliminary arraignment of more than six hours under certain circumstances); Steven A. Tomeo,
Suppression of Evidence, 21 CONN. PRAC. § 18:22 (2009) (discussing state “corpus delecti” rule as a
ground for suppressing a confession).
117
UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT §§ 2–3 (Unif. Law Comm’n, Draft
2010).
118
Indeed, as is discussed in detail infra text accompanying notes 126–152, at least seven states and the
District of Columbia have adopted, by statute, court rule, or judicial decision, some version of the
exclusionary rule for non-recording of the entire custodial interrogation process. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d
1156, 1165 (Alaska 1985); State v. Hajic, 724 N.W. 2d 449, 456 (Iowa 2006) (court order);
Commonwealth v. Diaz, 661 N.E. 2d 1326, 1328 (Mass. 1996) (ordering possible jury instruction if not
recorded but no clear rule); State v. Barnett, 789 A.2d 629, 630 (N.H. 2002) (excluding confessions if not
taped in full); IL. STAT. CH. 725 § 5/103–2.1 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29–4501 (2008). For a full list, see
Gershel, supra note 4, at 74. These states are in widely disparate areas of the country: Alaska (the
Northwest); Minnesota, Indiana, and Illinois (the Midwest); New Hampshire, New Jersey, and D.C. (the
Northeast); North Carolina (the South); and, arguably, Montana. Id.
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Moreover, although a per se rule of inadmissibility might have the greatest
deterrent effect and be easily administrable,119 such a rule’s inflexibility is also why it is
the version of the exclusionary rule most likely to face resistance. Such resistance stems
from the sense by some lawmakers that exclusion is a harsh remedy to be deployed only
where truly needed. Alaska, Indiana, and Minnesota (in Minnesota, for substantial
violations only) have adopted just such a simple, rigid rule, showing that its adoption is
nevertheless not beyond political reach in at least some states that apparently rejected the
characterization of exclusion as “unduly harsh.”120
It might be argued, however, that a statute, including this Act, may not “mandate”
that anything be considered in making a constitutional decision because constitutions
trump statutes.121 This argument fails for several reasons. First, the constitutional
question whether a confession is “voluntary” is to be made based upon the “totality of the
circumstances.”122 Among the recording mandate’s purposes is to give the courts a fuller
picture of the circumstances relevant to a confession’s voluntariness (by recording the
events fully and as they actually unfolded) and a stronger appreciation of the significance
for the voluntariness determination of the absence of that fuller picture.123 That absence
occurs where recording that should have taken place did not. Violation of the Act’s
recording mandate logically entails its consideration in the “totality of the circumstances”
test of voluntariness. For similar reasons, violation of the Act’s recording mandate should
be relevant in determining “reliability.”
Furthermore, even were a court to disagree, the Act can and should be understood
as creating a statutory ground for suppression of a confession on grounds of
involuntariness (if bracketed language is adopted, also on grounds of unreliability). This
ground is co-terminus with the constitutional due process involuntariness doctrine, with
the sole exception that violation of the Act’s recording mandates must be considered in
the voluntariness determination even if such consideration is not otherwise
constitutionally required. Indeed, to avoid any confusion on this ground, the Act spells
out involuntariness (and, for jurisdictions adopting bracketed language, unreliability) as a
specifically identified ground for suppression.124
119

The theory behind this assertion is that a per se rule makes suppression foreseeable, indeed guaranteed,
for violation of the Act, thus discouraging police interested in obtaining convictions that stick from
disobeying the Act’s dictates in the first place. See also Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard
Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 451 (2002) (discussing the importance of foreseeing the likelihood of
suppression as a justification for the exclusionary rule).
120
See Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1156 (unexcused failure electronically to record the entire interrogation
process where feasible at a place of detention results in exclusion under specified circumstances); State v.
Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 2004) (mandating suppression for “substantial” violations of a courtimposed rule, via its supervisory power, electronically to record custodial interrogations, though
“substantiality” does require a case-by-case analysis); IND. R. OF EVID. 617 (unexcused failure to record
entire interrogation process electronically requires suppression). On the other hand, in all three of these
states it was the courts, whether via decision or rule, that brought about the change in the law. The political
dynamic in state legislatures may prove different.
121
See generally Ron Villanova, LEGAL METHODS: A GUIDE FOR PARALEGAL AND LAW STUDENTS (1999).
122
See Peter Henning et al., MASTERING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 230–33 (2010).
123
See supra text accompanying notes 21–47.
124
UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT § 13(a) (Unif. Law Comm’n, Draft
2010).
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2. A Comparison to Other Jurisdictions in Greater Detail

As argued above, violation of the Act’s mandates should be relevant to any pretrial
motion in the sense that the court is deprived of the best evidence of the facts, including
subtleties of tone, voice, and expression. Moreover, the mere fact of such unjustified nonrecording may be relevant in resolving credibility disputes. The Act does spell out this
logic and its consequences by mandating that courts consider the Act’s violation in the
voluntariness and other relevant inquiries.125 But doing so does not require any outcome
concerning whether the confession in the particular case was indeed constitutional or not.
That decision remains the judge’s in the individual case. There is thus no conflict
between the statute and the Constitution. Several jurisdictions have indeed seen no such
conflict.126
Alaska and Minnesota have adopted a simple, rigid rule of per se exclusion for
violation of their recording mandates.127 Washington, D.C. created a softer rule of
presumed inadmissibility that can be rebutted by clear and convincing prosecution
evidence that the statement was nevertheless voluntary.128 Illinois also created a rule of
presumed inadmissibility that can be rebutted but differs from the D.C. rule in two ways:
(1) the prosecution must prove not only that the statement was voluntarily given but also
that it is reliable, given the totality of the circumstances; and (2) the prosecution’s burden
of proving these matters is only a preponderance of the evidence.129 Montana seems to
follow a variant of the Illinois rule. Thus the Montana statute declares that a judge “shall
admit statements or evidence of statements that do not conform to . . . [the recording
mandate] if, at a hearing, the state proves by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . the
statements have been voluntarily made and are reliable” or that certain exceptions
apply.130
The Illinois and Montana rules in particular permit trial use of statements
inexcusably obtained in violation of the recording mandate if the reliability concerns
arising from the recording’s absence are allayed by other evidence.131 Accordingly, these
states accept the idea that a remedy for violation of recording requirements must aim at
fact-finding accuracy, not only at deterrence.132 Because the prosecution has the
opportunity to prove that its noncompliance has created no harm, exclusion will be
applied less frequently under this approach than under a per se rule of inadmissibility and
125

See id.
See infra text accompanying notes 149–165.
127
See State v. Schroeder, 560 N.W.2d 739, 740 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) ( un-recorded statements lead to
suppression under specified circumstances); Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1156 (Alaska law requires exclusion
when confessions un-recorded under certain noted circumstances.).
128
D.C. CODE § 5-115.01(2001).
129
Supra note 118.
130
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-409 (2009).
131
Supra note 118; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-409.
132
On the importance of fact-finding accuracy relative to other values, see generally GEORGE THOMAS, THE
SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS
(2008) (surveying systemic flaws tilting the U.S. criminal justice system against adjudicative accuracy);
MIRJAN DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997) (comparing the U.S. evidentiary rules to Continental
European ones and finding the former wanting); BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES,
AND REMEDY (2003) (discussing the hallmarks and definition of systemic adjudicative accuracy).
126
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will kick in primarily where there is substantial reason to worry that we are in danger of
convicting the wrong man.
Other states have created still softer versions of the exclusionary rule. New Jersey,
for example, provides that an unexcused failure to record is a factor for the court to
consider in deciding whether to admit a confession.133 Where, as in New Jersey, nonrecording is but one factor in a case-specific weighing process, there is ample room for a
statement obtained in violation of recording mandates nevertheless to be admitted.134 Yet
the uncertainty—the remaining possibility of exclusion in a particular case—still provides
an incentive for police compliance.135
On the other hand, if the confession is admitted, New Jersey then requires that a
cautionary jury instruction be given if the defendant so requests.136 Exclusion and jury
instructions can thus be seen, as they are in New Jersey, as complementary rather than
alternative remedies.137 North Carolina follows a similar approach, making an unexcused
failure to record admissible to prove that a statement was involuntary or unreliable, but if
the confession is nevertheless admitted, requiring a jury instruction warning that the jury
may consider evidence of noncompliance in deciding whether a statement was voluntary
and reliable.138 Montana likewise provides for a cautionary instruction if a motion to
suppress a noncompliant, unrecorded statement is denied.139
Although not yet adopted by any state, there is still another approach to the
exclusionary rule: that proposed by the Constitution Project, which itself adopted a
variant of an early proposal by the American Law Institute.140 The Constitution Project
brings together, in a search for common ground, groups with opposing views on issues
central to maintaining liberty in a constitutional republic.141 The Project’s Death Penalty
Initiative recommended electronic recording of the entire custodial interrogation process
in capital cases and also recommended an exclusionary remedy for violations of that
mandate.142 Both the Constitution Project and ALI versions of an exclusionary remedy,
however, relied on a detailed, complex balancing process to guide judges, a process
133

State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 547 (2004) (appointing a committee to suggest electronic recording rules
under the court’s supervisory power); N.J. R. C.R. R. 3:17(d) (2011).
134
See infra note 155.
135
See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 583 (discussing the role of foreseeability in
suppression).
136
N.J. R. C.R. R. 3:17(e) (2011).
137
This point is discussed in more depth, infra subpart IIIB.
138
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-211(f)(3) (2011).
139
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-410 (2011). Indeed, of the states that have enacted recording statutes with
remedies, apparently only Wisconsin (arguably) and Nebraska (definitely) explicitly limit the remedy solely
to a cautionary jury instruction or, in a bench trial in Wisconsin, permits the judge to consider the weight of
the recording requirement violation in judging the worth of the confession. WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 972.115(2)(a)-(b) (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §29-4504 (2008). Maine, Maryland, and New Mexico
are simply silent about remedies, which may or may not preclude the courts from crafting their own. MD.
CRIM. PROC. § 2-402 (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-16 (1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B
(2011).
140
See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE: THE DEATH PENALTY REVISITED 83 (2006);
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROC. §§ 4.09(3), 130.4, 150.3(2)-(3) (1975).
141
See Safeguarding Liberty, Justice, and the Rule of Law: Who We Are, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
www.constitutionproject.org/whoweare.php (last visited Aug. 19, 2011).
142
See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 140, at 83–84.
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unnecessarily complex and therefore not adopted in the Act.143 Instead, the Act, while
sharing balancing of interests with the Constitution Project and ALI approaches to
exclusion, trusts judges to be capable of making this sort of judgment, one with which
they are well familiar in other areas, without the need for greater specificity or undue
limitation on their fact-finding and balancing discretion.
3. The Act’s Approach to Suppression Redux: Unreliability as a Ground for Pretrial
Motions
i. The Remedy’s Relative Novelty
This Act does not, importantly, limit the grounds of exclusion of the confession to
the well-recognized one of involuntariness.144 Instead, the Act also recognizes the
confession’s unreliability as a separate, stand-alone suppression basis. Such a reliance on
unreliability alone creates a statutory basis for confession-suppression unheard of in
federal constitutional law.145
In doing so, this Act fuses aspects of the Illinois and New Jersey approaches.
Illinois requires that the prosecutor prove by a preponderance of the evidence both that an
unrecorded statement was voluntary and that it was reliable—an approach seemingly
adopted by Montana as well.146 Absent such proof, exclusion of the confession is
mandated.147 North Carolina similarly recognizes both involuntariness and unreliability
as grounds for suppressing a confession.148 The ULC Act, unlike that in Illinois, never
mandates the exclusionary remedy but makes violation of the Act one factor in the
admissibility decision.149 In this respect, this Act’s approach mirrors New Jersey’s, which
also makes the failure to record but one factor in the admissibility decision.150 But, unlike
New Jersey, but like Illinois, Montana, and North Carolina, the ULC Act expressly
recognizes two potential grounds for excluding a confession based at least partly on the
failure to record: that failure’s relevance to proving the confession’s involuntariness and
its relevance to proving the confession’s unreliability.151

143

Compare id. with MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROC. (1975). I was the Reporter for the
Constitution Project’s Death Penalty Initiative at the time it endorsed a variant of the ALI model. The
Initiative’s thinking was that, despite the ALI proposal’s complexity, the ALI’s prestige would help to
overcome political barriers to the legislation. To the contrary, however, at least in the view of the ULC
drafting committee, the ALI proposal’s complexity, and that of the Constitution Project’s variant, was a
major barrier to adoption that prestige alone could not overcome. The ULC’s suppression remedy is thus
far more simply stated than the Constitution Project’s.
144
See UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT § 13(a) (Unif. Law Comm’n,
Draft 2010); infra text accompanying notes 146-210.
145
See supra note 144.
146
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(f) (2005) ; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-409 (2011); N.J. Ct. R. 3:17(b)
(2011).
147
See supra note 146.
148
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A–211.
149
Compare UERCI ACT § 13a with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1.
150
Compare UERCI ACT § 13a with N.J. CT. R. 3:17.
151
Compare UERCI ACT with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-409; N.J. CT. R.
3:17; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-211.
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Accordingly, in many states this Act might create a new basis for potential
exclusion of a confession. Because of the novelty of this approach in many states, further
comment on the role of reliability in suppression motions is warranted. Relative novelty
is also why the language of reliability in this section is bracketed.
ii. Justifying Unreliabililty as a Stand-Alone Ground for Suppression
The most common constitutional grounds for suppression of confessions are
violations of the Miranda rule and the involuntariness of the confession under the due
process clauses of the United States Constitution.152 A confession is “involuntary” only if
coercive police activity has overborne the suspect’s will.153 This subpart explores the
relationship between the involuntariness test under current law—which relies on concern
about a confession’s unreliability only when it results from police wrongdoing—and the
sounder constitutional and policy argument that unreliability worries should be the
central justification for the involuntariness test period—even when not traceable to
improper police action.
A complex of values underlies the constitutional due process involuntariness rule as
currently crafted.154 As noted above, in the high court’s view, a confession is
“involuntary” only if coercive police activity overbears the suspect’s will.155 The rule’s
most obvious concern seems to be with the suspect’s autonomy, that is, with preventing
his decision to confess from being the result of his voluntary choice.156 Yet the rule aims
in part to deter the state from being the cause of such involuntariness, so the rule applies
only when the state has placed undue pressure upon a suspect to confess.157
The seminal case of Colorado v. Connelly exemplifies this principle.158 There,
Connelly on his own approached a police officer, confessed that he had murdered
someone, and asked to talk about it. The trial court suppressed Connelly’s confession,
however, on involuntariness grounds after hearing expert testimony concluding that
Connelly suffered from a psychosis at the time of his confession that compromised his
ability to make free and rational choices. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, but the
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no coercive police activity
that rendered his confession one not freely made. Mental illness, not the state, was at
fault. Accordingly, no due process violation had occurred. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court famously said, “The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude
presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of
evidence, whether true or false.”159
Read in isolation, this quote might suggest that the majority was thoroughly
unconcerned with “reliability,” that is, with whether there is good reason to trust that the
confession was truthful. But that impression would be misleading. In other cases the
152

See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 657–58, 692–94, 708–16.
See id. at 659–60, 670–77.
154
See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 659–68.
155
See id. at 657–59.
156
See id. at 667.
157
See id. at 658.
158
479 U.S. 157 (1986).
159
Id. at 167 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)).
153
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Court and commentators have recognized that one important function of the voluntariness
test is to reduce the chances of convicting the innocent.160 The Court’s point was that the
danger of wrongful convictions is not alone sufficient to violate due process. The
exclusionary rule’s purpose in this area is to deter police overreaching.161 Where there is
no such overreaching to deter, the due process clauses are irrelevant, despite the risk to
the accuracy of the adjudication of guilt.162 Yet the Court recognized that a fundamental
purpose of a criminal trial is to admit “truthful and probative evidence before state
juries.”163 The Court additionally recognized that, even where coercive police activity is
lacking,
this sort of inquiry . . . [may] be resolved by state laws governing the
admission of evidence . . . A statement rendered by one in the condition of
respondent might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to
be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum . . . . 164
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, squarely addressed the reliability
question. Brennan’s main point of disagreement with the majority was that he thought
that free will and reliability, not overreaching by police officers, should be the sole
constitutional due process inquiries.165 Explained Brennan:
Since the Court redefines voluntary confessions to include confessions by
mentally ill individuals, the reliability of these confessions becomes a
central concern. A concern for reliability is inherent in our criminal justice
system, which relies upon accusatorial rather than inquisitorial practices.
While an inquisitorial system prefers obtaining confessions from criminal
defendants, an accusatorial system must place its faith in determinations of
“guilt by evidence independently and freely secured.166
Furthermore, said Brennan, “We have learned the lessons of history, ancient and
modern,” namely, that “a system of law enforcement which comes to depend on the
‘confession’ will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses” than a
system dependent upon skillful independent investigation.167 Indeed, Brennan was
particularly concerned about false or unreliable confessions because of their “decisive
160

See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973); WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES
§ 24:2 (2010); TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at
660–62.
161
See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959) (noting that excluding coerced confessions
under the due process involuntariness doctrine satisfies the “deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey
the law while enforcing the law” and “that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.”);
TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 658.
162
See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 658.
163
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166 (quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488–89 (1972)) (emphasis added).
164
Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
165
See id. at 181 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166
Id. at 181 (quoting in part Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)).
167
Id. at 181 (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488–89 (1964)) (emphasis added).
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impact on the adversarial process.”168 He explained, “Triers of fact accord confessions
such heavy weight in their determinations that ‘the introduction of a confession makes
other aspects of a trial superfluous, and the real trial, for all practical purposes, occurs
when the confession is obtained.’”169 Thus, he concluded, “[b]ecause the admission of a
confession so strongly tips the balance against the defendant in the adversarial process,
we must be especially careful about a confession’s reliability.”170
In other areas of due process the Court has reaffirmed that police overreaching, not
merely private or perfectly proper police conduct, is indeed a requirement for a due
process violation.171 Nevertheless, it has also made clear that it is simultaneously still
concerned with the reliability of fact-finding under the due process clauses.172 A
particularly apt example is the Court’s due process analysis of eyewitness identifications,
such as lineups or photo-spreads.173 The Court will not suppress an identification
resulting from a suggestive identification procedure unless that suggestion was
unnecessarily created by the police.174 But if the police have overreached in this area, the
sole remaining question for the Court in deciding the admissibility of the out-of-court
identification procedure is reliability.175 Indeed, says the Court, reliability is the
“linchpin” of the analysis.176 The Court will go even further and under certain conditions
suppress an in-court identification if it is the fruit of an unreliable out-of-court one.177
The reason for this is that the reliability of the in-court identification then itself becomes
suspect.178
Custodial interrogations, by definition, involve state action.179 Similarly, motions to
suppress confessions resulting from such interrogations necessarily involve claims of
168

Id. at 182.
Id. (quoting E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 316 (2d ed. 1972)). Social science supports this
conclusion. See infra subpart III.C (summarizing, in the context of discussing the admissibility of expert
testimony on confessions, research showing the tremendous persuasive power to juries of even false
confessions).
170
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 182.
171
See Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (noting that police overreaching is a component of a due process violation);
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (requiring “improper state conduct” as a prerequisite for a
due process violation justifying suppression of an allegedly suggestive identification procedure).
172
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (emphasizing that fact-finding needs to be reliable and open to
avoid due process violations); TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 659–67 (explaining that, and
why, reducing the risk of unreliable confessions is one of the goals of the due process doctrine requiring the
voluntariness of police-obtained confessions).
173
See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 910–912.
174
See id. at 910–11. The Court had the opportunity this term, however, to address the argument that
unreliable eyewitness identifications should be suppressed at trial where there is suggestion, even absent
state action. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. 716. The Court nearly unanimously rejected this argument, affirming
the requirement that a confession’s unreliability result specifically from “improper state conduct.” See id. at
728.
175
See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 912.
176
Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
177
Id. at 109–14 (reaffirming this test); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) (first articulating the
test).
178
See Manson, 432 U.S. at 109–14; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198.
179
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 421 (1984) (emphasizing that Miranda turns on a suspect
being interrogated incommunicado in a “police-dominated” atmosphere); UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT § 2(a) (Unif. Law Comm’n, Draft 2010) (defining “custodial
169
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police overreaching.180 Therefore, the logic of the Court’s due process jurisprudence
should permit an inquiry into reliability, including as part of the decision whether to
suppress a confession on grounds of involuntariness.181 But the involuntariness test still
contains the danger of admitting unreliable confessions—ones that may convict the
innocent—that are nevertheless not the result of an “overborne will.”182 Moreover, the
Court’s due process jurisprudence is rarely muscular, generally setting a very low floor of
reliability.183 Accordingly, it is wise to craft other mechanisms for making suppression on
the grounds of unreliability alone a basis for suppression.
interrogation” in a similar manner); cf. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (noting due process clause does not
govern confessions resulting from command hallucinations rather than state conduct). Remember that the
Fifth Amendment privilege originally applied only to the federal government and was “incorporated”
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.
760 (2003) (analyzing the distinction between freestanding due process violations and those violations of
the Fifth Amendment privilege incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause); TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 677–81 (synthesizing the many Chavez opinions).
Although doctrinally freestanding due process and incorporated-by-due-process Bill of Rights claims are
different, the former obviously must inform the latter for incorporation to make any sense. Cf. generally
ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
1789–1868 (2006) (articulating an extended defense of this general point as illustrated by the Fourth
Amendment).
180
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (expressing its entire thrust as preventing police
domination of the accused in ways that may constitute compulsion under the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination).
181
See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 47, at 660–67.
182
See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (confession resulting from hallucinations—thus arguably unreliable—not
excluded under the due process clauses because not the result of state actors overbearing the defendant’s
will).
183
See Jerold H. Israel, Freestanding Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search
for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS L.J. 303, 421 (2001) (“Accordingly, free-standing due process
should be construed ‘very narrowly’ based on the recognition that, ‘[b]eyond the specific guarantees
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation.’) (quoting in part Medina v.
California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992)). Even when freestanding due process does apply to criminal cases, the
Court, especially as it articulated its analysis in Medina, takes a cramped view of interest-balancing,
cramped in the sense of not giving reliability and other defendant interests much weight, as Professor Israel
explains:
In the course of applying the traditional fundamental fairness standard as prescribed by
Medina, a court, in its analysis of the impact of the challenged state procedure upon the structural
prerequisites of fairness, is likely to consider many of the same factors as it would in applying [the
civil due process balancing test of] Mathews. [v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)]. However, it will
do so from a perspective that prohibits only a serious undermining of the structural prerequisite
rather than one that considers whether the state has struck a reasonable balance in failing to
produce a procedure that would better implement that structural prerequisite. It will do so from a
perspective which states that “a state procedure ‘does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment
because another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise
of protection’” to the defendant, and that the states are entitled to substantial deference in their
judgments as to what is an appropriate balance between liberty and order in light of their
“considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure” and usual grounding of the “criminal
process . . . in centuries of common-law tradition.” In this sense, the Medina Court does appear to
eschew balancing and to utilize an inquiry that is “narrower.”
Id. at 423–24; see also Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479 (2006) (explaining at length the failures of
the Court’s due process and common law doctrines adequately to protect the reliability of confessions, a
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One such mechanism is the inherent supervisory power of the courts.184 A state
court case from Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista,185 illustrates the point:
The issue, however, is not what we “require” of law enforcement, but how
and on what conditions evidence will be admitted in our courts. We retain
as part of our superintendence power the authority to regulate the
presentation of evidence in court proceedings. The question before us is
whether and how we should exercise that power with respect to the
introduction of evidence concerning interrogations.186
The Massachusetts court’s primary reason for taking this action was this: where
there are “grounds for [doubting the] reliability of certain types of evidence that the jury
might misconstrue as particularly reliable,” curative action is required.187
Another basis for more muscular protections can be state due process clauses. This
approach indeed was followed by Alaska’s highest court in Stephan v. Harris.188 There,
the Court created an exclusionary remedy under its state constitution’s due process clause
for the failure electronically to record custodial interrogations in their entirety. According
to the Court, “[s]uch recording is a requirement of state due process when the
interrogation occurs in a place of detention and recording is feasible.”189 “We reach this
conclusion,” the Court explained, “because we are convinced that recording, in such
circumstances, is now a reasonable and necessary safeguard, essential to the adequate
protection of the accused’s right to counsel, his right against self-incrimination and,
ultimately, his right to a fair trial.”190 Due process, the court added, is not a “static”
concept but “must change to keep pace with new technological developments.”191 The
technological feasibility of electronic recording of the entire custodial interrogation
process was just such a development. Finally, the court concluded:
In the absence of an accurate record, the accused may suffer an
infringement upon his right to remain silent and to have counsel present
during the interrogation. Also, his right to a fair trial may be violated, if an
illegally obtained, and possibly false, confession is subsequently admitted.
An electronic recording, thus, protects the defendant’s constitutional
goal supposedly justifying those doctrines in the first place); Ruth Yacona, Manson v. Braithwaite: The
Supreme Court's Misunderstanding of Eyewitness Identification, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539 (2006)
(analyzing the weakness of the Court’s due process test for excluding suggestive eyewitness identifications
in protecting evidentiary reliability).
184
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 521–35 (Mass. 2004) (holding that a
sanction must be imposed on the state whenever it fails electronically to record the entire custodial
interrogation process, though creating the sanction of a jury instruction rather than suppression and
rejecting claims that this approach violated the separation of powers.)
185
Id.
186
Id. at 531–32.
187
Id. at 533.
188
711 P.2d 1156, 1159–63 (Alaska 1985).
189
Id. at 1159.
190
Id. at 1159–60.
191
Id. at 1161.
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rights, by providing an objective means for him to corroborate his
testimony concerning the circumstances of the confession.192
Commentators have also argued that Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 403 and its
state law equivalents already authorize suppression of evidence that is unreliable,
including interrogations.193 The argument is straightforward. Rule 403 gives the trial
judge discretion to exclude even relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a variety of countervailing concerns, including the dangers of unfair
prejudice and misleading the jury.194 Given the psychological data showing the powerful
tendency of even false confessions to induce juries to convict,195 argue these
commentators, a confession obtained under circumstances having strong indicia of
unreliability will mislead the jury.196 Accordingly, the trial court has the discretion to
exclude such evidence.
These same commentators also point out that some courts have embraced a
reliability rule on a variety of grounds but under the rubric of “trustworthiness.”197 Law
professor and social psychologist Richard Leo made the point thus:
Several state courts and the federal district courts have chosen to adopt
a . . . rule of corroboration, most often termed the “trustworthiness
standard” . . . . In marked contrast to the corpus delecti rule [requiring
merely proof independent of the confession that some crime indeed
occurred], the trustworthiness standard requires corroboration of the
confession itself . . . . Under the trustworthiness standard, before the state
may introduce a confession it “must introduce substantial independent
evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the
[confession] . . . . In effect, the trial court judge acts as a gatekeeper and
must determine, as a matter of law, that a confession is trustworthy before
it can be admitted. In making the trustworthiness determination, the judge
is to consider “the totality of the circumstances” . . . . Only after a
confession is deemed trustworthy by a preponderance of the evidence may
it be admitted into evidence.198
Leo outlines a variety of factors courts should consider, based upon the empirical
evidence, in making this trustworthiness or reliability determination, while also offering
his own variant on the reliability test.199 What matters here are not the details of any
particular approach but rather the recognition that the unreliability of a confession—one
bearing hallmarks raising a risk of the confession’s falsity, or lacking any evidence
suggesting the alleviation of such a risk—should be an independent ground for
192

Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).
See FED. R. EVID. 403; LEO, supra note 3, at 288.
194
See FED. R. EVID. 403.
195
See infra text accompanying notes 232–233.
196
See LEO, supra note 4, at 288.
197
See id. at 281–85.
198
See id. at 284.
199
See id. at 283–91.
193
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suppression from that of involuntariness. Several states, and a growing number of
proposals, would indeed more broadly embrace the reliability standard as one governing
a wide array of evidence raising the risk of wrongful convictions, including, for example,
“snitch” testimony and that of questionable experts.200 In the interrogation context, Leo
and others have recognized, furthermore, that electronic recording is essential to sound
fact-finding concerning a confession’s reliability.201 The ULC Act recognizes that
violation of the Act’s recording mandates should be one factor in a motion to suppress a
confession as unreliable but rejects the arguably draconian solution of per se exclusion
under such circumstances.202
A Uniform Act promises sounder and more uniform approaches to the remedies
question. State constitutional due process clauses, as interpreted by their courts, and those
courts’ interpretations of the scope of their inherent supervisory power over the
admission of evidence, will vary widely.203 Reliance on state equivalents to FRE 403 as
grounds for exclusion based upon unreliability is uncertain, given the dearth of court
decisions on the point.204 Some courts articulate fuzzy grounds for their approach to
reliability questions, and some approaches are too inflexible and harsh.205 Legislative
action, by contrast, brings a democratic imprimatur and the significant investigative
resources of the legislature to bear on designing appropriate remedies.206
Finally, some commentators have argued that even the prospect of exclusion is
unnecessary to deter police resistance to recording requirements because the virtues of
the procedure will quickly become evident to police once they start recording.207 Whether
this is so is a subject of some controversy, but even if it is true, deterring police
overreaching is not the sole goal of the recording requirement.208 One of its primary goals
200

See Alexandra Natapoff, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE
191, 194–95 (2009); STEVEN FRIEDLAND, PAUL BERGMAN & ANDREW E. TASLITZ, EVIDENCE LAW AND
PRACTICE 376–79 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the “reliability” test for admitting what is claimed to be
questionable expert testimony).
201
See LEO, supra note 4, at 291–305.
202
See UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT § 13(a) (Unif. Law Comm’n,
Draft 2010).
203
See Thomas P. Sullivan, Andrew W. Vail & Howard W. Anderson, III, The Case for Recording Police
Interrogations, LITIGATION, Spring 2008, at 30, 37 (noting that less than a handful of state courts have
interpreted their state due process clauses or their inherent supervisory power to require electronic
recording of custodial interrogations).
204
The New Jersey Supreme Court in a pathbreaking recent decision may, however, have given new life to
this approach in innocence cases, finding that the state’s equivalent to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 could
justify sometimes excluding unreliable eyewitness identifications where the state was not the source of
suggestions. See State v. Chen, 208 N.J. 307 (2011) (creating an exclusionary rule for unreliable eyewitness
identifications involving privately induced suggestion under New Jersey’s equivalent to Federal Rule of
Evidence 403).
205
See, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 1985); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591
(Minn. 1994); supra text accompanying notes 149–150 (discussing per se rules of exclusion).
206
See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Liberalism Versus Classical Liberalism, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 667
(2004) (praising the importance of the democratic imprimatur achieved by legal change through
legislation); Gavin Drewry, Law-Making Systems—How To Compare, 29 STATUTE L. REV. 100, 105
(2008) (conceding that formal legislative action is usually necessary to giving law democracy’s
imprimatur).
207
See Sullivan & Vail, supra note 59.
208
See supra text accompanying notes 21–64.
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is to prevent conviction of the innocent and to promote conviction of the guilty.209
Admitting an unreliable confession creates precisely the risk of wrongful conviction that
the Act seeks to prevent. The case law summarized above and ample psychological
research demonstrate the grave risk of unreliability of unrecorded confessions and the
equally grave risk that jurors are not well-equipped to spot such unreliability.210
The only fully effective remedy for an innocent person who has given an unreliable
confession is to exclude it as evidence entirely. But the failure to record does not alone
establish such unreliability but rather turns on a case-specific judgment by the trial court.
Accordingly, the Act leaves that judgment to the trial court while making plain that it is a
judgment that the court must make and that the failure to record is a relevant factor in
making this judgment.
B. Jury Instructions and Their Relative Efficacy
1. The Virtues of Instructions Where Videotaping Inexcusably Fails to Occur
The Act provides a second remedy for its violation: giving the jury cautionary
instructions. The Act does not itself mandate, however, any particular cautionary
language. In this subpart, I discuss some of the important attributes which should make
their way into any jury instruction on violations of a recording statute.
Thomas Sullivan, one of the leading national advocates for electronic recording of
custodial interrogations, and his co-author, Andrew Vail, have strongly endorsed
cautionary jury instructions as a remedy for violation of recording mandates.211 Sullivan
and Vail argue that fear of such instructions will provide a significant deterrent to law
enforcement violations of the provisions of mandatory recording acts.212 They further
argue that jury instructions will help to improve the reliability of jury fact finding when
the jury is faced with mere oral testimony rather than having a verbatim recording of the
entire custodial interrogation process.213 New Jersey has followed just such an approach,
declaring in its recording rule that, “in the absence of electronic recordation required . . .
[under this Rule], the court shall, upon request of the defendant, provide the jury with a
cautionary instruction.”214 Pursuant to that mandate, the New Jersey judiciary has
prepared fairly lengthy model jury charges as a remedy for violation of the statute.215
Instructions are already an available remedy in several other jurisdictions, including
Montana, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts,216 highlighting the urgency of getting
the instructions right.
Sullivan and Vail’s proposed instruction would caution jurors that the officers in
the case before them inexcusably failed to comply with a recording requirement—one
209

See supra text accompanying notes 21–64.
See Richard Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational
Action, 74 U. DENV. L. REV. 979, 1120–22 (1997); Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confessions
Discovered, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 623 (2007).
211
See Sullivan & Vail, supra note 59.
212
See id. at 218–19.
213
See id.
214
N.J. Ct. R. 3:17 (2011).
215
Id.
216
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-409 (2011); N.J. Ct. R. 3:17; see Sullivan & Vail, supra note 59, at 218–19.
210
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designed to give jurors a complete record of what occurred; that the jurors consequently
have been denied “the most reliable evidence as to what was said and done by the
participants” so that the jurors “cannot hear the exact words used by the participants or
the tone or inflection of their voices.”217 The proposed instruction would conclude as
follows: “Accordingly, as you go about determining what occurred during the interview,
you should give special attention to whether you are satisfied that what was said and done
has been accurately reported by the participants, including testimony as to statements
attributed by law enforcement witnesses to the defendant.”218
Sullivan and Vail at least implicitly argue that many jurisdictions might give
cursory cautionary instructions without a fairly detailed model.219 Specifically, many
courts might give standard instructions about treating a confession with caution without
adequately specifying the reasons why jurors should do so in a way that will enable the
jurors truly to understand the dangers to reliability created by the failure to record.220
There is also an argument to be made that more detailed instructions explaining precisely
why caution is needed may more effectively improve the jury’s ability fairly to assess the
evidence given the powerful impact that confessions have on juries.221 Given such an
impact, there may be a risk that brief jury instructions will be ignored or have little effect,
particularly given the often weak or perverse effects of jury instructions in many contexts
(see the more detailed discussion of this last point below).222 That reason is likely why
Sullivan and Vail counsel providing a fairly lengthy standard instruction in the recording
statute itself. Sullivan has been more explicit on this point in drafting a model federal
statute that includes standard jury instructions on the ill consequences of the unexcused
failure to record.223
Here is a variant, with changes I have made to meet the needs of the ULC Act, of
their complete instruction, which might serve as the basis for a model instruction:
The law of this state required that the interview of the defendant by
law enforcement officers which took place on [insert date] at [insert place]
be electronically recorded, from beginning to end. The purpose of this
requirement is to ensure that you jurors will have before you a complete,
unaltered, and precise record of the circumstances under which the
interview was conducted, what was said, and what was done by each
person present.

217

Sullivan & Vail, supra note 59, at 221.
Id.
219
Compare Thomas P. Sullivan, Recording Federal Custodial Interviews, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1297,
1319 (2008) (suggesting more detailed instructions than previously used by some federal courts), with
Sullivan & Vail, supra note 59, at 217–26 (suggesting different instructions than are used in many states).
220
See Sullivan, supra note 219, at 1319; Sullivan & Vail, supra note 59, at 218–21, 225 (proposed specific
statutorily mandated instructions rather than leaving it to judicial discretion).
221
See Richard A. Leo & Steven Z. Drizin, The Three Errors: Pathways to Wrongful Conviction, in POLICE
INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS 27 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010)
(“People find detailed, vivid, and plausible confessions to be persuasive evidence of guilt, even when they
turn out to be false.”).
222
See infra subpart III.B.2.
223
Sullivan, supra note 219, at 1342.
218
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In this case, the law enforcement officers did not comply with that
law. They did not make an electronic recording of the interview of the
defendant. [They made an electronic recording that did not include the
entire process of interviewing the defendant, from start to finish]. The
prosecution has not presented to the court a legally sufficient justification
for not complying with that law. Instead of an electronic recording, you
have been presented with testimony about what took place during the
custodial interrogation, based upon the recollections of the law
enforcement officers [and the defendant]. [Instead of a complete record of
the entire process of interviewing the defendant, they have left you with
only a partial record of the events].
Therefore, I must give you the following special instructions about
your consideration of the evidence concerning that interview.
Because the interview was not electronically recorded as required by
our law, you have not been provided the most reliable evidence about
what was said and what was done by the participants. You cannot hear the
exact words used by the participants, or the tone or inflection of their
voices. [Because the interview process was not electronically recorded in
its entirety as required by law, you have not been provided with the most
reliable and complete evidence of what was said and done by the
participants].
Accordingly, as you go about determining what occurred during the
interview, you should give special attention to whether you are satisfied
that what was said and done has been accurately reported by the
participants, including testimony as to statements attributed by law
enforcement witnesses to the defendant. It is for you, the jury, to decide
whether the statement was made and to determine what weight, if any, to
give to the statement.224
These proposed model instructions combine elements of Sullivan’s proposed
federal instructions and of his later-proposed and similar state-level instructions,225 with
modifications made to adjust the instructions to a uniform act, like that of the ULC,
recommended for state level adoption.
The length of this sample instruction is unusual in comparison to many sorts of
common instructions, and some observers may fear that a lengthy instruction will lead
jurors to give undue weight to the failure to record by over-emphasizing it.226
Alternatively, critics may worry that a lengthy instruction may backfire, either confusing
jurors or further impressing in their mind the fact that a confession was made rather than

224

See Sullivan & Vail, supra note 59, at 225–26 (one source that was adapted to create the above
instruction); Sullivan, supra note 219, at 1342–44 (2008) (proposing an analogous instruction for federal
court).
225
See Sullivan & Vail, supra note 59; Sullivan, supra note 219.
226
This was, at least, a fear expressed by some members of the ULC drafting committee.
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that it was inexcusably unrecorded, (if there were a recognized excuse, no jury instruction
would be given).227
The Act, in subsection 13(b), leaves trial judges ample discretion in crafting
instructions meeting the needs of each individual case.228 Consequently, the Act
mandates only that remedial instructions be given, leaving the details and length of those
instructions to the trial court.229 Nevertheless, the sample instructions provided here may
help to inform trial judges’ decisions on this question.
2. The Limitations of Sole Reliance on Instructions as a Remedy
It is important to explain why such instructions will not suffice as a sole remedy.
Notably, there is no empirical data on whether the availability of jury instructions will be
an adequate deterrent to violations of recording mandates.230 Furthermore, jury
instructions will also be unavailable in bench trials. More importantly, however, there is
ample reason to question whether jury instructions alone will improve jurors’ accuracy in
assessing the weight to give confessions obtained in violation of recording requirements
sufficiently to compensate for the absence of a complete recording. The ULC drafting
committee knew of no completed studies specifically examining the effect of jury
instructions concerning the failure to electronically record the entire interrogation
process. (Such studies are, however, under way).231 Moreover, ample studies show that
juries routinely give confessions enormous weight, even under circumstances where there
is substantial reason to be concerned about the confessions’ accuracy.232
More specifically, research has shown that jurors are not good at separating true
from false confessions—in fact do no better than chance—but do improve their ability to
judge confession accuracy when the entire interrogation process is videotaped and proper
227

Cf. BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS,
PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 263 (1995) (concluding that improperly crafted instructions used by some
courts actually decreased the jury’s ability properly to assess the trustworthiness of suggestive eyewitness
identifications).
228
See UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT § 13(b) (Unif. Law Comm’n,
Draft 2010).
229
See id.
230
Jury instruction research tends to focus on the impact of the instructions on jurors or on their ability to
understand the instructions, not on the deterrent effect on police, prosecutors, or others of fearing a
cautionary instruction. See Memorandum from Andrew E. Taslitz to Drafting Comm. on Elec. Recordation
of Custodial Interrogations, Social Science Memorandum on the Impact of Cautionary Jury Instructions
Concerning the Unexcused Failure to Record the Entire Custodial Interrogation Process (Oct. 8, 2008)
available at www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/erci/ss_memo.pdf (hereinafter Taslitz, Jury Instruction
Memorandum) (summarizing research).
231
Social scientists Neil Vidmar, one of the leading experts on juries, and Richard A. Leo, perhaps the
premier expert on interrogations research, and I are currently working on just such an empirical project.
232
See Leo & Drizin, supra note 221, at 25 (“Once a suspect has confessed, the formal presumption of
innocence is quickly transformed into an informal presumption of guilt that overrides their analysis of
exculpatory evidence”; furthermore noting that juries, upon hearing evidence that the defendant confessed,
“tend to selectively ignore and discount evidence of innocence.”); Lassiter & Geers, supra note 50, at 198–
200 (summarizing the research showing that various forms of cautionary jury instructions concerning the
risk of a confession’s being involuntary or inaccurate have little impact on the high likelihood of guilty
verdicts, concluding that “these studies unequivocally demonstrate that people do not necessarily evaluate
and use confession evidence in the ways prescribed by law.”).
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camera angles are used, that is, angles not focusing solely on the suspect.233 Jury
instructions alone are thus unlikely to improve jurors’ accuracy where they are denied
recordings of the entire interrogation process. Moreover, where there is no excuse for the
police failure to record, there seems little justification for ignoring this risk to the
innocent.
Ample social science studies concerning wrongful convictions in other areas (albeit
analogous ones) than custodial interrogations also support the conclusion that jury
instructions will do too little to improve jurors’ ability accurately to assess credibility and
correctly to determine whether a confession was true or voluntary.234 The effect of
instructions on jurors varies with the subject matter of the instruction, and some can be
modestly effective.235 Yet, overall, instructions are frequently either ineffective in
changing jurors’ reasoning or have unintended effects.236 Research examining jury
instructions in the most thoroughly examined cause of wrongful convictions, namely,
unreliable eyewitness identification procedures, has particularly shown cautionary
instructions to be of little, if any, help to jurors in making good judgments about whether
the police had the right man.237 This similar potential risk in the area of false confessions
is indeed no minor matter, for innocence concerns were among the primary forces
motivating the movement for electronic recording in the first place.238 The point of
stressing the limitations of cautionary jury instructions as a remedy is not to deny that
they may be likely to have some, perhaps substantial, deterrent value or that they may
modestly improve jury reasoning. Logic suggests that cautionary instructions should help
at least somewhat on both these scores. Furthermore, cautionary instructions are a modest
233

See Leo & Drizin, supra note 221, at 25 (“[F]alse confessors whose cases are not dismissed pretrial will
be convicted (by plea bargain or jury trial) 78% to 85% of the time, even though they are completely
innocent.”); G. Daniel Lassiter, Lezlee J. Ware, Matthew J. Goldberg & Jennifer J. Ratcliff, Videotaping
Custodial Interrogations: Toward a Scientifically Based Policy, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE
CONFESSIONS, 143–57 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010) (collecting research and
concluding that jurors are best at differentiating true from false confessions when the camera focuses solely
on the interrogator, second best when it focuses equally on the interrogator and the suspect, but suspectfocus camera angles alone “appear[] to actually diminish the capability of decision makers to arrive at
objectively correct assessments.”).
234
The social science supporting the arguments made in this paragraph is concisely summarized at Taslitz,
Jury Instruction Memorandum, supra note 230.
235
See id.
236
See id.
237
See id. at 6–7.
238
See supra text accompanying notes 21–34.; False Confessions, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited August 28, 2011)
(collecting cases of innocent persons wrongly sentenced to death or life based in part upon a false
confession); GARRETT, supra note 19, at 14–44 (analyzing these cases). These errors are hard to correct
because, given the powerful impact of confessions on juries and others (see supra text accompanying notes
232–233) it is unlikely that the system will accept having convicted the wrong man absent DNA evidence
proving his innocence. See Orenstein, supra note 69 (discussing the psychological forces that make it hard
for police and prosecutors trying to do the right thing to admit that they have made mistakes resulting in
conviction of the innocent or that changing their procedures can prevent future error). Critics of the
exclusionary rule, including those on the Court, have indeed focused their ire on the rule’s application to
Fourth Amendment violations while generally embracing the rule’s wisdom where the reliability of the
fact-finding process is at stake. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, Criminal Justice, and the
Rehnquist Court: The Sluggish Life of Political Factfinding, 94 GEO. L.J. 1589 (2006).
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and traditional judicial remedy. A court may conclude that, though suppression is not
justified, some remedy is needed to reduce the risk of error—of convicting an innocent
man—given the absence of the best evidence of the confession’s voluntariness and
reliability, namely, the absence of electronic recording. The availability of jury
instructions would allay concerns that suppression may prove to be too “draconian”
because suppression will not be the only remedial option available to the trial judge. But
the limitations of cautionary instructions counsel against relying on them too heavily as
the sole judicial remedy.239
C. Expert Testimony
One novel remedy for violation of recording requirements that is not included in
the Act is to admit expert testimony on the factors contributing to involuntary or false
confessions, the reasons why videotaping is desirable, and the risks of not videotaping.240
Although a substantial minority of the Act’s drafting committee’s members supported
including this remedy in the Act, a majority did not. Yet, in addition to promoting more
reliable fact-finding, the expert testimony provision adds deterrent value because police
and prosecutors will fear that the expert testimony will make jurors more skeptical than
they otherwise would be about the weight of the unrecorded confession. The systemic
goal, of course, is that jurors be no more or less skeptical than the evidence warrants, but
239

See supra text accompanying notes 230–238. Analogous data suggests that jury instructions’ impact can
be weak or perverse, at least if not given in conjunction with other remedies, such as expert testimony
alerting jurors to the reliability problems with certain evidence and to jurors’ own reasoning problems that
may interfere with their ability to give evidence its appropriate weight. Cf. ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND
THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 131–33 (1999) (defending the use of such experts concerning rape
victim behavior and jury reasoning processes in rape cases); Jennifer Devenport, Christopher D.
Kimbrough & Brian L. Cutler, Effectiveness of Traditional Safeguards Against Erroneous Conviction
Arising from Mistaken Eyewitness Identification, in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 61–64 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009) (concluding that jury instructions currently
relied upon by the courts concerning eyewitness identification accuracy “either have no effect or enhance
juror skepticism rather than juror sensitization to eyewitnessing and identification conditions,” leading the
authors to suggest that “the courts may benefit from a set of cautionary instructions that more closely
resemble expert psychological testimony,” though the authors concede that expert testimony in the
eyewitness area might, in the view of some commentators, itself raise different problems). The case for the
admissibility of expert testimony in the area of custodial interrogations is even stronger, however, than the
case for using social science experts in these analogous areas. See infra note 240–255. Furthermore, in
some cases the reliability of the confession may be so in doubt, and the jury’s ability adequately to grasp
that point so insufficient, that suppression of the confession in its entirety is required to protect against the
risk of wrongly convicting the innocent. See GARRETT, supra note 19, at 14–45 (giving examples of
extraordinarily unreliable confessions convincing juries to convict men who were later proved innocent).
But cf. David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, (forthcoming 2012)(arguing
that jury instructions need not be perfect to be useful in certain circumstances).
240
See LEO, supra note 3, at 314–16 (arguing that a “substantial and widely accepted body of scientific
research” supports using experts on the factors affecting confession accuracy at trial and that such social
scientist testimony is needed because traditional safeguards, including cautionary jury instructions, “are not
sufficient to safeguard individuals against the likelihood of wrongful convictions based on unreliable
confession evidence”); Solomon M. Fulero, Tales from the Front Expert Testimony and the Psychology of
Interrogations and Confessions Revisited, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS 211–22
(G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010) (arguing that such expert testimony is scientifically
valid and reliable, useful to juries, and admissible under existing evidence rules governing experts).
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trial adversaries fear contrary outcomes and are thus motivated to avoid the risk of such
outcomes in the first place. The value of this remedy has not been studied empirically.
There is growing recognition, however, of the need for expert testimony whenever the
risk of wrongful convictions looms.241 Indeed the American Bar Association has included
similar provisions meant to encourage expert testimony in the area of eyewitness
identifications in the ABA’s Innocence Standards.242 Empirical research in the area of
eyewitness identifications reflects positively on the usefulness of expert testimony for
recording evidence as well. That research reveals that expert testimony on the factors
affecting eyewitness accuracy substantially improved jurors’ sensitivity to the relevance
and weight of those factors—even when the science contradicted jurors’
preconceptions—and this effect was apparently even greater among jury-eligible adults
than among undergraduate jurors.243
Moreover, critics’ fears that such testimony would unduly increase acquittals of the
guilty have proven unwarranted.244 One recent review of the literature explained this last
point thus:
Some judges have objected to psychologist experts on the ground that they
might have too much influence on the jurors, causing them to undervalue,
as opposed to overvalue, the eyewitness. However, a series of experiments
conducted by different researchers have shown that this is not likely to
happen. The studies have found that testimony by an expert increased the
amount of time that mock jurors spent discussing the reliability of the
witness and made jurors more sensitive to the effects of different viewing
conditions and other factors relevant to the ability to identify a defendant.
There was no indication in the experiments that the jurors accepted the
expert testimony uncritically or that they completely discounted the
eyewitness testimony. The findings are consistent with research we’ve
noted elsewhere regarding the ability of jurors to keep expert evidence in
perspective and to evaluate it in conjunction with other evidence.245
241

See LEO, supra note 3, at 314–16 (recommending use of such expert testimony where there is a risk of a
false or involuntary confession); Roy S. Malpass et al., The Need for Expert Psychological Testimony on
Eyewitness Identification, in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 3
(Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009) (arguing for the importance of expert testimony on eyewitness identification to
avoid wrongful convictions).
242
See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 13, at 41–42.
243
See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 227, at 239–40 (summarizing the research).
244
See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 195 (2007) (“Some judges
have objected to psychologist experts on the ground that they have too much influence on the jurors,
causing them to undervalue, as opposed to overvalue, the eyewitness); Neil Vidmar & Regina Schuller,
Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (1989)
(providing an extended response to the claim that juries will overvalue psychological background
testimony); Michael R. Lieppe & Donna Eisenstadt, The Influence of Eyewitness Expert Testimony on
Jurors’ Beliefs and Judgments, in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION 188–89 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009) (arguing that experimental data shows that, under
certain conditions, eyewitness experts can appropriately increase juror skepticism about eyewitness
identification evidence but do not increase skepticism more than the data allows).
245
See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 244.
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The consistency of the eyewitness research with other research on experts suggests that
similar results might obtain with experts on interrogations.246 Because jury instructions
alone are likely do too little to help a jury evaluate a confession’s voluntariness or
accuracy where there is no recording of the interrogation process, expert testimony
suggests itself as an important supplementary remedy.247
The ULC drafting committee originally saw the wisdom of such an approach. A
draft section of the Act included a rule urging the admissibility of expert testimony in
appropriate cases as a remedy for recording violations where such testimony had not
otherwise been admitted.248 The testimony would still need at least to be consistent with
supporting scientific data, that is, with state expert evidence rules analogous to those in
FRE 702 through 706.249 Moreover, the “appropriateness” decision need not even be
considered unless “the defendant first offers evidence sufficient to permit a finding by a
preponderance of the evidence of facts relevant to the weight of the statement the full
significance of which may not be readily apparent to a layperson.”250 Furthermore, the
Act provided guidance to the trial court in making its decision about whether a case is an
“appropriate” one for admitting expert testimony by listing a set of common but nonexclusive circumstances that the empirical research suggests may affect a confession’s
reliability, a point that might not be readily apparent to layperson jurors.251 Such a listing
of illustrative but not exclusive situations or factors to consider in applying an evidentiary
standard is common, most familiarly in FRE 404(b).252 The factors listed to guide the
appropriateness decision in the proposed section of the Act included these:
the vulnerability to suggestion of the individual who made the statement;
the individual’s youth, low intelligence, poor memory, or mental
retardation; use by a law enforcement officer of sleep deprivation, fatigue,
or drug or alcohol withdrawal as an interrogation technique; the failure of
the statement to lead to the discovery of evidence previously unknown to a
law enforcement agency or to include unusual elements of a crime that
246

See, e.g., Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 244 (arguing for the admissibility generally, on a wide range of
issues, of “social framework” expert evidence—evidence about the general background psychological
principles relevant to a jurors’ task).
247
Ample empirical and theoretical work suggests that jurors are ignorant of important lessons learned
from the empirical study of interrogations and confessions and thus should benefit substantially from
testimony on those topics if offered by a qualified expert. See, e.g., Danielle E. Chojnacki, An Empirical
Basis for the Admission of Expert Testimony on False Confessions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2008) (analyzing
surveys revealing the average person’s ignorance of the likelihood that innocent persons may confess and
the factors affecting that likelihood); LEO, supra note 3, at 314 (“The use of social science expert testimony
involving a disputed interrogation or confession has become increasingly common. . . . There is now a
substantial and widely accepted body of scientific research on this topic, and the vast majority of American
case law supports the admissibility of such expert testimony.”).
248
See UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT § 13(c) (Unif. Law Comm’n,
Draft July 1, 2008).
249
The courts of a variety of jurisdictions are divided on the Frye/Daubert question. See Kyle C. Reeves,
Prosecution Function: False Confessions and Expert Testimony, in THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 123,
123–29 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009).
250
See UERCI ACT § 13(c) (2008).
251
See id.
252
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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have not been made public previously or details of the crime not easily
guessed and not made public previously; inconsistency between the
statement and the facts of the crime; whether an officer conducting the
interrogation educated the individual about the facts of the crime rather
than eliciting them or suggested to the individual that the individual had
no choice except to confess; promises of leniency; and the absence of
corroboration of the statement by objective evidence.253
This approach did not mandate admissibility of expert testimony as a remedy in
every case and put the initial burden of demonstrating the potential value of such
testimony on the defendant. Even once that demonstration was made, however, the trial
court would have been required to determine that the case was an appropriate one for
expert testimony. The admissibility of such testimony would have been an individualized
determination but with substantial guidance given trial courts concerning how to make
that determination. Supporters endorsed the expert testimony provision because some
courts have expressed undue reluctance to admit such testimony.254 To promote fairness
and accuracy, the draft version of the Act also expressly provided that the prosecution
may offer its own expert evidence in rebuttal.255
Unfortunately, in my view, the drafting committee ultimately abandoned this
provision after a first reading of the Act to the entire ULC. Members of the judiciary
particularly opposed the provision as encroaching on their necessary exercise of judicial
discretion in evidentiary matters. It is unclear how providing guidance to courts and
urging them to be more receptive to a category of expert testimony than they have been in
the past—testimony needed by jurors and supported by sound science yet inexplicably
resisted256—acts as an undue limitation on judicial discretion. Nevertheless, judicial
opposition was intense. For that reason, dropping the provision was the right thing to do
to create an enactable statute. As a policy matter, however, it might have been a mistake.
IV. RULEMAKING
A. Monitoring and Guiding Police Performance
1. The Need for Rules Designed to Implement the Act
The Act authorizes various bodies (jurisdictions may choose to which of these
bodies responsibility should be assigned) to make internal law enforcement rules to
253

See UERCI ACT § 13(c) (2008). These factors are those articulated by leading social science authors in
the field. See, e.g., LEO, supra note 3, at 216–35, 253–54, 263–66, 286–91.
254
See GARRETT, supra note 19, at 40 (“However, judges often deny indigent defendants the funds to hire
such [interrogation] experts or they refuse to allow such testimony). But see LEO, supra note 3, at 314 (It
was argued that looking at cases without written opinions reveals frequent judicial willingness to admit
such testimony, a very different conclusion than that reached by looking only at reported cases. Supporters
of an expert testimony remedy in the Act argued that such testimony is especially necessary where no
electronic recording of the entire custodial interrogation process was made because the jury is then
especially handicapped in identifying flaws in the process).
255
See UERCI ACT § 13(c) (2008).
256
See id.
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accomplish the Act’s mandate.257 Building into a statute some means of monitoring
police performance is highly desirable. Ample empirical literature demonstrates that
transparency and accountability improve police performance.258 At its best, these
mechanisms function both internally—enabling police administrators to monitor their
line officers’ efforts—and externally, enabling outside political bodies and the citizenry
more generally to provide further layers of review.259 Furthermore, systematic data
collection improves law enforcement’s ability to see the big picture, enhancing the
quality of its services over time and highlighting areas in which further internal
regulation or legislative control may be necessary.260 Regulations also provide clear
guidance to officers charged with implementing the provisions of this Act, anticipating
potentially problematic situations, reducing transition costs, and improving police
efficacy and efficiency.261 It is for similar reasons that subsection 14(a) requires adoption
and enforcement of rules designed to implement this Act.262
The Washington, D.C. statute, which allows police to adopt an implementing
general order,263 and the general order adopted pursuant to it, provide an outstanding
example of what well-designed rules should be.264 The D.C. order, though more detailed
than a model statute, reflects some basic requirements that a sound statute should contain,
including:
1. mandates for detailed data collection within, and review by superiors
within, each police department;
257

See id. at § 15.
See generally DAVID A. HARRIS, GOOD COPS: THE CASE FOR PREVENTATIVE POLICING (2005); Taslitz,
supra note 51.
259
Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation, and the Politics of Science,
4 CARDOZO J. PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS 271 (2006) (explaining the importance of internal/external review
processes, albeit in another context).
260
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power to Inspire
Political Action, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 221, 244–48 (2003).
261
See HARRIS, supra note 258; Samuel L. Walker, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950–1990 18–23, 30–40 (1993); Samuel L. Walker, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY (2005).
262
UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT § 14(a) (Unif. Law Comm’n, Draft
2010).
263
D.C. CODE § 5-116.02 (2001).
264
The D.C. general order requires commanders or superintendents of detectives’ divisions to approve
requests for deviations from standard recording procedures; ensure that adequate manpower and material
resources for recording are made available; ensure that prosecution requests for original and backup
recordings are timely met; and compile statistics that include the number of custodial interrogations
conducted, the number required to be recorded, the subset of these not recorded, the reasons for not doing
so, and the sanctions imposed for failing to record when required. See General Order from D.C. Metro.
Police, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations (effective Feb. 2, 2006), available at
https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_304_16.pdf. Commanders and superintendents of detectives’ divisions
must also forward the compiled statistics to the Assistant Chief of the Office of Professional Responsibility
by a specified date each month; ensure Detective Unit maintenance of an electronic recordings logbook
containing detailed information and documenting a chain of custody; and ensure that all officers are aware
of and comply with the general order. See id. That order further requires the Assistant Chief of the Office of
Professional Responsibility to submit annually to the Chief of Police a report of relevant statistics that
includes, but is not limited to, the data categories compiled by commanders. Id.
258
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2. clear, explicit assignments of supervisory responsibilities to specific
individuals and a clear chain of command to promote internal
accountability;
3. a mandated system of explanation for procedural deviations and
administrative sanctions for those that are not justified;
4. a mandated supervisory system expressly imposing on specific
individuals a duty of ensuring adequate manpower, education, and
material resources to do the job, and;
5. a mandated system for monitoring the chain of custody and responding
to prosecutor evidence and informational requests to ensure
responsiveness to the needs of the judicial branch, and to translate
police action into reliable evidence ready for efficient use by the courts
and by lawyers in both trial and pre-trial proceedings.265
More generally, D.C.’s approach suggests a statutory mandate for police to draft
detailed internal regulations for implementing general statutory requirements.266
Section 14 of the ULC Act accordingly outlines the minimum important subjects to
be included in police regulations, but leaves the details to other entities.267 The Act offers
states three bracketed options concerning who should draft those details: “[e]ach law
enforcement agency in [the] state”; an “appropriate state authority” to be identified by
name in the state’s version of this Act; or the “state agency charged with monitoring law
enforcement’s compliance with this Act.”268 There are scores of existing model
regulations from police departments already mandated to, or voluntarily choosing to,
record upon which drafting entities may draw for models.269
Some states, such as Maine, have already instituted much more detailed approaches
than those which the ULC Act would require. Maine’s example may be useful in
generating ideas about what details and mechanisms for creating and implementing
regulations a particular state might choose to follow. Maine’s statute requires all law
enforcement agencies to adopt written policies concerning electronic recording
procedures and for the preservation of investigative notes and records for all serious
crimes.270 The statute also requires this same Board of the Trustees of the Maine Criminal
Justice Academy of the State Department of Public Safety, by a specified date, to
establish minimum standards for each law enforcement policy.271 The chief
administrative officer for each law enforcement agency must, likewise, certify to the
Board that the agency has adopted written policies consistent with the Board’s standards
265

See id.; see also SULLIVAN, supra note 10 (containing 2006 version of Washington, D.C. regulations on
electronically recording custodial interrogations, regulations already containing the core elements of a
sound administrative system as summarized here).
266
See D.C. CODE § 5-116.02 (2001).
267
See UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT § 14 (Unif. Law Comm’n, Draft
2010).
268
See id. at § 15(a).
269
See SULLIVAN, supra note 10.
270
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B (2012). Furthermore, the chief administrative officer of each
agency must certify to the Board that attempts were made to obtain public comment during the formulation
of these policies. Id.
271
Id.
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and later certify that the agency has provided orientation and training for its members
concerning these policies.272 The Board must also review the minimum standards
annually to determine whether changes are necessary; they identify needs by critiquing
actual events or reviewing new enforcement practices demonstrated to reduce crime,
increase officer safety, or increase public safety.273 The chief administrative officer of a
municipal, county, or state law enforcement agency must further certify to the Board that
the agency has adopted a written policy regarding procedures for dealing with requests
for freedom of access to recordings of interrogation or to the various documents and data
that the statute requires be created or gathered; this same officer must designate a person
trained to respond to such requests. This system must help to balance privacy concerns of
interviewees facing potential trials with the need for public access and evaluation.274
Maine’s Board, pursuant to this statute, drafted a requirement of a written policy,
including at least certain minimum subject matters.275 More specifically, the Board
required written policies to address at least thirteen specific items, including:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.

recognizing the importance of electronic recording;
defining it in a particular way;
defining custodial interrogation in a particular way;
doing the same in defining “place of detention” and “serious crimes”;
reciting procedures for preserving notes, records, and recordings until
all appeals are exhausted or the statute of limitations has run;
recognizing a specified list of exceptions to the recording requirement;
outlining procedures for using interpreters where there is a need;
mandating officer familiarity with the procedures, the mechanics of
equipment operation, and any relevant case law;
mandating the availability and maintenance of recording devices and
equipment;
outlining a procedure for the control and disposition of recordings,
and;
outlining procedures for complying with discovery requests for
recordings, notes, or records.276

The Maine Chiefs of Police Association further drafted a generic advisory model
policy to aid local agencies in drafting their own individual policies to comply with the
statute’s and the Board’s mandates.277 That model policy included a statement apparently
272

Id.
Id.
274
Id.
275
Me. Criminal Justice Acad., Bd. of Trustees Minimum Standards, at 20–21 (Jan. 13, 2012), available at
www.maine.gov/dps/mcja/links/documents/MandatoryMinimumStandardsasof1-13-2012.doc (outlining the
Academy’s policy on “Recording of Law Enforcement Interviews of Suspects in Serious Crimes and the
Preservation of Investigative Notes and Records in Such Cases”).
276
Id.
277
See General Order from Me. Chiefs of Police Ass’n, Recording of Suspects in Serious Crimes (Feb. 11,
2005), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/false/federal/MaineChiefsPolicy.pdf (stating
that the policy does not create a higher legal standard of care than would otherwise be imposed by
preexisting law and that administrative remedies are the only ones available for the policy’s violation). The
273
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seeking to reject any civil tort claims arising from the policy, the policy declaring that it
provides the basis only for administrative sanctions—not court imposed ones—by the
individual agency or the Board.278
2. Delegation of Rulemaking Power Concerns: A Brief Note
Many state courts will invalidate statutes that delegate rule-making power without
“adequate” guidance to regulatory agencies.279 But, it is unlikely that this provision will
prove troublesome in this regard. Illinois’ requirements are representative of those in
many states.280 In Illinois, a legislative delegation of regulatory authority will be valid if
the legislature meets three conditions: first, it identifies the persons and activities subject
to regulation; second, it identifies the harm sought to be prevented, and; third, it identifies
the general means intended to be available to the administrator to prevent the identified
harm.281 The statute must also create “intelligible standards” to guide the agency in the
execution of its delegated power, but these criteria need not be so narrow as to govern
every detail necessary in the execution of the delegated power.282

wisdom of limiting civil remedies under the Act is discussed later. See also infra text accompanying note
310.
278
See General Order, supra note 277, at 2-23A-6.
279
Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Legislative Power, The Delegation of Powers, in 1
SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 137, at 192–205 (2008) (providing a fifty-state
survey of state-level delegation rules). The nondelegation (sometimes called the “delegation”) doctrine is
rooted in separation of powers principles, as Professor Ira Robbins explains:
Although the Constitution does not explicitly state that Congress may not delegate its
powers to others, the Supreme Court has asserted the principle that Congress may not delegate its
powers to other branches of the government or to private parties. Roots of the doctrine are found
both in article I of the Constitution, which states that “all legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States,” and the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. As Justice Brandeis pointed out, the two concepts are related: “The
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.” The constitutional limits on executive
power serve to prevent arbitrary executive action under the conviction that the people must look to
representative bodies and courts to protect their liberties. Protection of the individual from the
arbitrary and capricious exercise of power, by an official body or a private party acting under
delegated authority, is an essential element of free government. Thus, the underlying purpose of
the delegation doctrine should be to provide needed protection against uncontrolled discretionary
power.
Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L. REV. 911,
915–16 (1988). Note that the doctrine prohibits only delegation against “uncontrolled discretionary power,”
id., that is, the failure to provide adequate guidance to, for example, administrative agencies so that they do
not, in effect, replace the legislature. See Victor B. Flatt, The “Benefits” of Non-Delegation: Using the
Non-Delegation Doctrine to Bring More Rigor to Benefit-Cost Analysis, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1087, 1092–95 (2007). The doctrine has rarely been invoked by the United States Supreme Court to
invalidate administrative agency action. Id. at 1094. States apply a similar delegation doctrine analysis
under their state constitutions. See Singer & Singer, supra 279, at 192.
280
See Singer & Singer, supra note 279, at 194–95 (summarizing delegation doctrine in various states,
including Illinois).
281
See Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co., 369 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ill. 1977).
282
Forest Pres. Dist. of DuPage Cnty. v. Brown Family Trust, 323 Ill. App. 3d 686, 692 (2d Dist. 2001).
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The ULC Act, read as a whole, clearly identifies law enforcement agencies and
officers as the “persons” regulated by the Act, while further identifying the “activity
subject to regulation” as custodial interrogation, which is defined in Miranda, and is a
definition with which law enforcement have been familiar for over four decades.283 The
statute further clearly declares that this activity is regulated in one specific way: it must
be electronically recorded, a term defined in the text of the Act.284 Similarly, the Act
clearly aims at preventing three sorts of harms: the creation of involuntary confessions or
of false or unreliable ones, and the maximization of the fact finder’s ability to identify
involuntary, false, or unreliable confessions.285 Moreover, the means for law enforcement
agencies to carry out their responsibilities are identified in numerous provisions: those
describing when recording is necessary and when it is not (i.e., the various exceptions),
those identifying what paperwork must be prepared and when, and those addressing
remedies that include internal discipline; these are just a few of the provisions offering
detailed guidance.286 Finally, the Act provides easily intelligible standards to guide the
law enforcement agency, so that it will know with some specificity when, where, and
how it must tell officers to record.287 The Act’s guidance is sufficiently specific to offer
law enforcement agencies guidance but not so detailed as to straightjacket their choice of
specifics.288 For these reasons, the ULC drafting committee concluded that the delegation
doctrine should not be a cause for concern, and it is not addressed in any greater detail
here.
B. Numbers of Cameras and Angle
A special comment must be made about § 15(c). Section 15(c) requires rules to be
made governing the manner of recording, including the proper camera angle. I address
camera angles again here, though I did so briefly earlier, because § 15(c) focuses on
rulemaking relevant to such camera angles, requiring a bit more in-depth explanation of
why such a specific rulemaking subject is expressly mentioned in the Act.289 Section
15(c) is bracketed because it applies only in jurisdictions that require both audio and
video recording.290 Requiring rules specifying the number of cameras to use and their
angle may seem like a small, unimportant detail. It is not. Indeed, ample research
demonstrates that jurors are best at differentiating true from false confessions when the
camera focuses solely on the interrogator, and only second best when it focuses equally
283

See UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT §§ 2(3)–3 (Unif. Law Comm’n,
Draft 2010); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
284
See UERCI ACT § 3.
285
See supra text accompanying notes 5–8.
286
See UERCI ACT §§ 3–13.
287
See id. at § 15(b)-(c).
288
See infra text accompanying notes 297–310 (comparing the Act’s specificity with the greater detail
found in the District of Columbia and Maine’s statutes and policies).
289
See supra text accompanying notes 53 and 233. Proper camera angles are so important to aiding jurors’
judgment accuracy that an initial draft of the Act that I proposed expressly specified what those camera
angles should be. However, the drafting committee ultimately concluded that there may sometimes be
legitimate technical, cost, and interrogation-effectiveness reasons that make those camera angles difficult to
achieve. Accordingly, the final version of the Act mandates that law enforcement adopt rules concerning
proper camera angles, and addressing what those angles should be in commentary.
290
See UERCI ACT § 15(a), (c).
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on the interrogator and the suspect.291 Yet, a suspect-focus camera angle alone “appears
to actually diminish the capability of decision makers to arrive at objectively correct
assessments.”292 This last point is particularly important because it is counterintuitive:
audio recording may be superior to audio and video combined if the video focuses solely
on the suspect.293 The combination of audio and video, it must be stressed, is the best way
to improve accuracy, but only if the camera focus is equally and simultaneously on both
the suspect and the interrogator, or even on the interrogator alone.294
Most statutes and regulations ignore these details. One exception is North Carolina,
which recognizes their importance, declaring that, if a visual record is made, “the camera
recording the interrogation must be placed so that the camera films both the interrogator
and the suspect.”295 Thomas Sullivan, in his latest proposed statute, also addresses this
matter, declaring that, “If a visual recording is made, the camera or cameras shall be
simultaneously focused on both the law enforcement interviewer and the suspect.”296 The
Innocence Project of Cardozo University Law School, in its proposed model statute,
makes a similar recommendation.297
C. Civil and Administrative Remedies and Their Linkage to Sound Rules
1. Internal Police Department Discipline of Its Officers
Violations of recording mandates that do not produce confessions or that produce
confessions not offered as evidence at a criminal trial cannot be remedied by the criminal
justice system. Often civil liability will, likewise, be unavailable under such
291

See Lassiter et al., supra note 233, at 143–57.
Id. at 153.
293
Id. at 152 (describing data supporting the conclusion that “confession presentation formats that provide
access to suspects’ facial cues seem to hinder rather than help observers accuracy with regard to
differentiating true from false confessions,” and this is particularly true where the sole focus of the camera
is on the suspect); see also id. at 155 (“[T]ime and time again the research demonstrates that this [suspectfocus] perspective leads to biased and inaccurate assessments of videotaped interrogations, which could
increase the possibility of an innocent person being wrongfully prosecuted and ultimately wrongfully
convicted.”).
294
See id. at 154–55 (recommending, ideally, an audio-video presentation that focuses solely on the
interrogator, secondarily, one that focuses equally on both the interrogator and suspect, but arguing for
suppression of the video—and use only of the audio portion and of the transcript—where the video was
made to focus solely on the suspect); see also id. at 155 (discouraging a split-screen presentation of face-on
views of both suspect and interrogator as increasing the risks of error, thereby favoring a camera angle that
simultaneously and equally focuses on the suspect and interrogator, or on the interrogator alone). For
additional summaries of relevant empirical studies supporting these conclusions, see Lassiter & Geers,
supra note 50, at 198–208; LEO, supra note 3, at 250–51; Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police
Interrogations and Confessions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 235 (1991); Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel,
Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 27, 27–46 (1996).
295
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A–211 (West 2012).
296
Sullivan & Vail, supra note 59, 224.
297
INNOCENCE PROJECT, Model Legislation, 2011 State Legislative Sessions: An Act Directing the
Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations (Nov. 2011),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/2011/modelbills/Recording_of_Custodial_Interrogations_Model_Bil
l_2011.pdf.
292
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circumstances.298 In such cases, the only effective deterrent, if any, to an individual
officer’s future mistakes will be administrative discipline. While court remedies may be
uncertain, administrative sanctions are relatively certain, if vigorous enforcement is
statutorily mandated, as this Act requires.299 Administrative sanctions likely help in
deterring future error, as analogous empirical evidence and psychological and economic
theory suggest.300 The knowledge that such sanctions will be available if the Act is
violated can lead officers to act with great care and deliberation concerning recording
procedures.301 For these reasons, § 15(d) mandates that law enforcement agencies adopt
rules imposing graded systems of sanctions on individual officers, sanctions reasonably
designed to promote compliance with this Act.302 If well-designed, that graded system
298

See infra text accompanying notes 306–310 (discussing limitations placed on civil suits).
See UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT § 15(d) (Unif. Law Comm’n,
Draft 2010).
300
Cf. Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363,
364–68 (1999) (discussing the importance of administratively sanctioning individual officers through
liquidated damages to achieve deterrence). Slobogin suggests that liquidated damages would constitute a
percentage of the field officer’s salary, and he would be personally liable unless he acted in good faith, in
which case the department would be strictly liable. Id. Slobogin justifies his argument primarily on two
grounds, both related to improved deterrence. First, he argues that behavioral theory states that a
punishment will be an effective deterrent only if the punishment is relatively certain, intense, and quickly
and consistently imposed without creating incidental counter-incentives to engage in the prohibited
conduct. Id. at 373–81. Second, he argues that procedural justice research shows that those punished are
less likely to re-offend if they feel that they have been treated fairly. Id. at 381–84. He argues that Fourth
Amendment doctrine is so riddled with exceptions to privacy invasion or use of the exclusionary rule, and
likely to cause officer resentment if the guilty person goes free, as to undermine both these deterrent forces.
Id. at 384–90. He dismisses ordinary damages actions as so unlikely to succeed and difficult to prove that
they also fail as a deterrent. Id. at 384–85. But, he favors administrative imposition of liquidated financial
sanctions on individual officers as the primary means of administrative sanctioning. He argues such on the
theory that other kinds of administrative sanctions will not work because “police superiors have a hard time
punishing hard-working cops for mistakes made at the margin, at least when there is no external pressure to
do so.” Id. at 384.
There are several reasons why this concern should not apply under the Act. Notably, the Act
contains so many exceptions to the recording mandate that it is hard to imagine how a hardworking, even
minimally well-trained, officer could make a mistake by not recording where it is required in a “marginal,”
or ambiguous, situation. The inapplicability of any exception should be clear in the vast majority of cases.
Thus, the prospect of sanctions is most likely to arise among officers who act in bad faith. As for those
officers who are ignorant, perhaps harsh sanctions are not wise for an initial violation, but could be useful
for educational purposes. Moreover, the Act’s separate provision protecting departments from tort liability
should apply only if they have adopted and properly implemented rules designed to educate officers and to
monitor officer performance. See UERCI ACT § 16(c). This can create incentives for departments to
properly train their officers and to give them appropriate feedback. Finally, the law specified in the Act is
far more simple than Fourth Amendment law with respect to policing.
301
Cf. Slobogin, supra note 300, at 373–79 (explaining the psychological processes by which individual
sanctions, particularly in terms of liquidated damages and penalty schedules, make it more likely to achieve
deterrence).
302
See UERCI ACT § 15(d); Slobogin, supra note 300, at 373–81 (reciting the general nature of these
principles and applying them to search and seizure law violations). Such reasonable design should require
attention to the principles of certainty and fairness of punishment that Slobogin summarizes. Sanctions
could include administratively imposed monetary penalties, even liquidated ones. I do not dispute that a
system like the one Slobogin proposes may provide an especially effective deterrent. But the diversity of
departmental cultures and needs coupled with the political obstacles to mandating a single uniform set of
299
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should give officers proper notice of the likelihood of particular sanctions and its
severity. The subsection is bracketed, however, because in collective bargaining states,
the subject matter of subsection (d) would be controlled by collective bargaining
agreements.303
2. Limitation of Actions for Violation of the Act
Section 16 of the Act addresses civil liability. Section 16(b) unequivocally states
that this Act does not, by its terms, create a civil cause of action against an individual law
enforcement officer.304 Subsection (b) adds further clarity by declaring that the only
sanction that may be imposed upon an individual officer who violates this Act is
administrative discipline, though it does not mandate such discipline.305 However, the Act
does not preclude state courts or legislatures from finding, under legal principles other
than those stated in the Act, a civil cause of action against a law enforcement agency for
violations of the Act.306 Subsection (a) gives law enforcement agencies a safe harbor
against such liability if they adopt and enforce rules reasonably designed to ensure
compliance with this Act.307 Section 16(a) is, thus, closely linked with § 15: a law
enforcement agency adopting and enforcing the rules provided for in § 15 will be
protected from civil liability, should individual officers violate the Act despite the
reasonable efforts of the law enforcement agency.308
The major justification for § 16(a) is that it will provide an incentive to law
enforcement agencies to vigorously implement the mandates of this Act, including
providing adequate resources (e.g., electronic recording equipment, officer training,
maintenance staff training) to get the job done.309 If a law enforcement agency creates
and enforces procedures well-designed to result in vigorous enforcement of this Act,
there seems little justification in exposing it to civil liability for the occasional error by an
individual officer. In addition, since the primary responsibility and power to ensure
compliance with this Act rests with the law enforcement agencies, little is gained in terms
of fairness or deterrence by exposing individual officers to civil liability.310
penalties gives police some flexibility to craft internal sanctions consistent with these principles and is the
best that could reasonably be expected given the circumstances. Moreover, local experimentation might
reveal new ideas on the sanctions question and could provide best practices models in the future.
303
See UERCI ACT § 15(d); 16A MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 45:37 (3d ed., updated 2011) (explaining that
police collective bargaining, or union bargaining, agreements, in states adopting collective bargaining
procedures for the police generally include grievance procedures to address when certain sanctions may
appropriately be imposed against individual officers).
304
See UERCI ACT § 16(b).
305
Id.
306
See id. at § 16(a) (“A law enforcement agency that is a governmental entity in this state which has
implemented procedures reasonably designed to enforce the rules adopted pursuant to Section 15 and
ensure compliance with this [act] is not subject to civil liability for damages arising from a violation of this
[act].”).
307
Id.
308
See id. at §§ 15, 16(a).
309
See Taslitz, supra note 93, at 502–04, 566–73 (making similar point in the context of search and seizure
policy).
310
This assertion, I admit, is subject to serious dispute. See Slobogin, supra note 300, at 364–68 (arguing
for the importance of individual officer civil liability). But if these criticisms are correct, I note only this:
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One helpful analogy—and one that the drafting committee found persuasive—
occurs in the federal law concerning Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment
cases.311 An employer is vicariously liable for its supervisory employees’ actions in such
cases but can raise, as an affirmative defense, that the employer both exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior, and that the
plaintiff employee failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.312 The result of this defense has
been for many employers to adopt and implement anti-harassment policies.313
Critics have charged that courts are often too deferential to employers in upholding
defenses based on weak policies—policies unlikely to correct bad behavior and, in fact,
not doing so.314 Furthermore, there is significant evidence that effective training
programs are the most valuable mechanism for improving compliance, and these policies
have sometimes promoted such programs.315 These programs are likely to be most
effective when they also contain an individualized component addressing the training
no adequate system of officer individual liability has occurred in the Fourth Amendment search and seizure
area because the political obstacles to such a system are so fierce. See generally id. at 384–85 (arguing that
administratively imposed liquidated damages would be a superior remedy to the current tort remedies,
where success is rare and damages usually minimal); Morgan Cloud, Rights Without Remedies: The Court
that Cried “Wolf,” 77 MISS. L .J. 467, 503–05 (2007) (arguing that leaving remedies for Fourth
Amendment violations to the political branches alone would effectively mean no real remedies at all);
Donald Dripps, The Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, and the Roberts Court: Normative and
Empirical Dimensions, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 213–14 (2010) (“The practically relevant rules for
damage actions against the police thus have not changed for more than thirty years.”). Slobogin actually
makes a powerful intellectual case for change in the area of Fourth Amendment violations with respect to
political branches. However, none of these changes have occurred. There is no reason to believe that the
politics will be any different in the area of custodial interrogation. Entity liability is probably more
politically feasible, particularly where entities have an option to escape liability entirely, as the Act
provides. See id. at 219–20 (noting that even when tort suits succeed, police departments routinely
indemnify individual officers, thus shifting all liability to entities such as the police department and
municipality).
311
See Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 403 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that individuals are not
liable under Title VII claims); Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious Discrimination:
Firm-Based Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J. CORP. 347, 408–09 (2008) (same).
There was no sufficiently analogous legal provision specifically applicable to the police of which the
drafting committee was aware. However, police officers are, indeed, employees, and the logic of
motivating employees and their employers to achieve desired social goals that are embodied in the Title VII
statute and case law, thus, made sense to the drafting committee members in internal discussions, any
differences specific to the police appearing irrelevant to the committee.
312
E. Jacob Lindstrom, All Carrots and No Sticks: Moving Beyond the Misapplication of Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 111, 111–12 (2010) (summarizing the law, though
criticizing lower courts for giving it an overly expansive application).
313
See Jonathan D. Hoag, Textual Harassment Trends Particularly Troubling for Illinois Employees, J. OF
THE DUPAGE CNTY. BAR ASS’N. (2010), http://www.dcbabrief.org/vol220610art2.html.
314
See Lindstrom, supra note 312, at 117–19, 123–24. Many critics agree, however, that helpful policies
can be, and have been, designed by employers eager to take advantage of the reasonable care defense. See
Joanna Grossman, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Do Employers Efforts Truly Prevent Harassment,
or Just Prevent Liability?, FINDLAW (May 7, 2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20020507.html
(praising Mitsubishi’s recent policies for managing to “change its workplace culture to stem the
proliferation of harassment.”).
315
See Grossman, supra note 314 (citing social science research that demonstrates the effectiveness of
certain anti-sexual-harassment training programs in actually reducing sexual harassment).
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needs of particular employees.316 At the same time, critics emphasize the need for
employers to track their programs and tinker with them to improve their actual
effectiveness, based upon performance, in reducing sexual harassment.317 Such tracking
is needed to avoid prevention programs from becoming mere publicity stunts rather than
serious efforts to resolve the harassment problem.318
These are reasons enough to provide a similar defense to law enforcement agencies
under this Act. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that properly designed rules,
including training programs, detailed guidance on procedures, and effective internal
sanctioning measures are significantly effective in improving police performance in a
range of areas.319 Proper program design is key; that is why § 14 of this Act—which the
drafting committee saw as reflecting in part lessons from the experience under Title VII
—stresses that rules address training and education.320 It is also why the rules mandated
by that section require a process for explaining noncompliance.321 Ample social science
research demonstrates that the mere knowledge that one must explain his or her actions
improves performance, including that of the police.322 Moreover, the availability of other
potential remedies—not simply a defense against civil liability—provided for in this Act
should present an even greater incentive for creating sound regulatory policies and
zealously enforcing them than is true in the case of sexual harassment.
Some commentators have indeed argued that the United States Supreme Court has,
in its constitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence, been moving toward recognizing a
“reasonable care” defense to suppression motions based on constitutional violations,
perhaps doing so as well in civil actions for such violations.323 Although this Act may not
be constitutionally mandated, the logic of improving deterrence while avoiding penalties
where there is minimal entity or individual culpability makes much sense and is followed
here.
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319
See HARRIS, supra note 258, at 155–71 (articulating an extended defense of this point); WALKER,
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 261, at 4–5 (same).
320
See UNIF. ELEC. RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT § 14 (Unif. Law Comm’n, Draft
2010).
321
See id. at § 15.
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See Taslitz, supra note 51, at 52–54, 65–66 (making this point and summarizing the relevant literature);
MICHAEL KAPLAN & ELLEN KAPLAN, BOZO SAPIENS: WHY TO ERR IS HUMAN 138–39 (2009) (same);
Stephen A. Myers & Norbert Gleicher, A Successful Program to Lower Cesarean-Section Rates, 319 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1511 (1988) (noting that a hospital's asking its pediatricians voluntarily to explain why they
chose to perform each Caesarean section—with no sanction being imposed for whatever answer they
gave—alone resulted in Caesarean rates dropping dramatically from 17.5% to 11.5%); George
Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEH. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 272, 286–87 (1996) (finding that asking gay men to record why they had unprotected
sex alone greatly reduced its occurrence.).
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See Taslitz, supra note 93, at 483–90 (the Court has adopted a culpability-based analysis of the
exclusionary rule and other remedies, at least in the area of constitutional regulation of the police under the
Fourth Amendment, and departments making all reasonable efforts to avoid individual officer errors would
not be culpable and, thus, would not be deserving of “punishment,” but would find a “safe harbor” from it).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Electronic Recordation of Custodial Interrogations Act is, from a
policy perspective, not perfect. It would benefit from provisions addressing the use of
expert testimony where law enforcement has, without excuse, failed to record a custodial
interrogation in its entirety. It might also benefit from a stronger suppression remedy. But
these policy weaknesses are few and highlight the Act’s real strength: it resulted from
compromise and deliberative debate among a wide range of parties. The Act is far more
likely to receive widespread support from all stakeholders than many more purist
proposals. It also is an important effort by a prestigious organization to foster reducing
convictions of the innocent while improving our ability to catch and punish the guilty. It
provides states great flexibility in crafting a statute that meets their needs. Yet, it does
require recording at least some custodial interrogations in their entirety. Experience
teaches that using a recording, in some instances, will prove so fruitful for law
enforcement that they will, over time, seek expansion of the numbers of instances in
which a recording is required. Moreover, the Act contains provisions to promote
efficiency and accountability, modeling its commentary on jury instructions and other
matters, and offering incentives for police to record. The Act is, therefore, a huge step
forward.
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APPENDIX
Uniform Electronic Recordation of Custodial Interrogations Act
Copyright 2012 by Uniform Law Commission
General Provisions
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the Uniform Electronic
Recordation of Custodial Interrogations Act.
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. In this [act]:
(1) “Custodial interrogation” means questioning or other conduct by a law
enforcement officer which is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from an
individual and occurs when reasonable individuals in the same circumstances would
consider themselves in custody.
(2) “Electronic recording” means an audio recording or audio and video recording
that accurately records a custodial interrogation. “Record electronically” and “recorded
electronically” have a corresponding meaning.
(3) “Law enforcement agency” means a governmental entity or person authorized
by a governmental entity or state law to enforce criminal laws or investigate suspected
criminal activity. The term includes a nongovernmental entity that has been delegated the
authority to enforce criminal laws or investigate suspected criminal activity. The term
does not include a law enforcement officer.
(4) “Law enforcement officer” means:
(A) an individual employed by a law enforcement agency whose
responsibilities include enforcing criminal laws or investigating suspected criminal
activity; or
(B) an individual acting at the request or direction of an individual
described in subparagraph (A).
(5) “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, statutory trust, estate,
trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public
corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any
other legal or commercial entity.
(6) “Place of detention” means a fixed location under the control of a law
enforcement agency where individuals are questioned about alleged crimes or [insert the
state’s term for delinquent acts]. The term includes a jail, police or sheriff’s station,
holding cell, and correctional or detention facility.
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(7) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.
(8) “Statement” means a communication whether oral, written, electronic, or
nonverbal.
SECTION 3. ELECTRONIC RECORDING REQUIREMENT.
(a) Except as otherwise provided by Sections 5 through 10, a custodial
interrogation [at a place of detention], including the giving of any required warning,
advice of the rights of the individual being questioned, and the waiver of any rights by
the individual, must be recorded electronically in its entirety [by both audio and video
means] if the interrogation relates to [a] [an] [felony] [crime] [delinquent act] [or]
[offense] described in [insert applicable section numbers of the state’s criminal and
juvenile codes]. [A custodial interrogation at a place of detention must be recorded by
both audio and video means.]
(b) If a law enforcement officer conducts a custodial interrogation to which
subsection (a) applies without electronically recording it in its entirety, the officer shall
prepare a written or electronic report explaining the reason for not complying with this
section and summarizing the custodial interrogation process and the individual’s
statements.
(c) A law enforcement officer shall prepare the report required by subsection (b) as
soon as practicable after completing the interrogation.
(d) [As soon as practicable, a law enforcement officer conducting a custodial
interrogation outside a place of detention shall prepare a written report explaining the
decision to interrogate outside a place of detention and summarizing the custodial
interrogation process and the individual’s statements made outside a place of detention.]
[(e)] This section does not apply to a spontaneous statement made outside the
course of a custodial interrogation or a statement made in response to a question asked
routinely during the processing of the arrest of an individual.
Legislative Note: In subsection (a), a state that wants to require recording of all
custodial interrogations, regardless of where they occur, should omit the bracketed
phrase “at a place of detention.” A state that wants to limit the recording requirement to
a place of detention should instead keep that bracketed phrase. Each state must also
decide whether it wants to require video recording in addition to audio recording. If a
state intends to also require video recording, it should include the bracketed language
“by both audio and video means.” If a state elects to require recording of all custodial
interrogations, regardless of location, but wishes to require video recording only of those
occurring at a place of detention, the state should not adopt that bracketed language
(“by both audio and video means”) but should instead adopt the bracketed sentence at
the end of subsection (a). In a state that elects this last option, and only in such a state,
subsection (d) becomes relevant. It is for this reason that subsection (d) is also bracketed.
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SECTION 4. NOTICE AND CONSENT NOT REQUIRED. Notwithstanding [cite
statutes], a law enforcement officer conducting a custodial interrogation is not required to
obtain consent to electronic recording from the individual being interrogated or to inform
the individual that an electronic recording is being made of the interrogation. This [act]
does not permit a law enforcement officer or a law enforcement agency to record a
private communication between an individual and the individual’s lawyer.
Legislative Note: The bracketed language refers to any state statute requiring that
an individual be informed of, or consent to, the recording of the individual’s
conversations. The “notwithstanding” clause makes clear that the electronic recording of
a custodial interrogation is exempt from all the requirements of any such notice and
consent statutes.
SECTION 5. EXCEPTION FOR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. A custodial
interrogation to which Section 3 otherwise applies need not be recorded electronically if
recording is not feasible because of exigent circumstances. The law enforcement officer
conducting the interrogation shall record electronically an explanation of the exigent
circumstances before conducting the interrogation, if feasible, or as soon as practicable
after the interrogation is completed.
SECTION 6. EXCEPTION FOR INDIVIDUAL’S REFUSAL TO BE RECORDED
ELECTRONICALLY.
(a) A custodial interrogation to which Section 3 otherwise applies need not be
recorded electronically if the individual to be interrogated indicates that the individual
will not participate in the interrogation if it is recorded electronically. If feasible, the
agreement to participate without recording must be recorded electronically.
(b) If, during a custodial interrogation to which Section 3 otherwise applies, the
individual being interrogated indicates that the individual will not participate in further
interrogation unless electronic recording ceases, the remainder of the custodial
interrogation need not be recorded electronically. If feasible, the individual’s agreement
to participate without further recording must be recorded electronically.
(c) A law enforcement officer, with intent to avoid the requirement of electronic
recording in Section 3, may not encourage an individual to request that a recording not be
made.
SECTION 7. EXCEPTION FOR INTERROGATION CONDUCTED BY OTHER
JURISDICTION. If a custodial interrogation occurs in another state in compliance with
that state’s law or is conducted by a federal law enforcement agency in compliance with
federal law, the interrogation need not be recorded electronically unless the interrogation
is conducted with intent to avoid the requirement of electronic recording in Section 3.
SECTION 8. EXCEPTION BASED ON BELIEF RECORDING NOT REQUIRED
(a) A custodial interrogation to which Section 3 otherwise applies need not be
recorded electronically if the interrogation occurs when no law enforcement officer
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conducting the interrogation has knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead an
officer reasonably to believe that the individual being interrogated may have committed
an act for which Section 3 requires that a custodial interrogation be recorded
electronically.
(b) If, during a custodial interrogation under subsection (a), the individual being
interrogated reveals facts and circumstances giving a law enforcement officer conducting
the interrogation reason to believe that an act has been committed for which Section 3
requires that a custodial interrogation be recorded electronically, continued custodial
interrogation concerning that act must be recorded electronically, if feasible.
SECTION 9. EXCEPTION FOR SAFETY OF INDIVIDUAL OR PROTECTION
OF IDENTITY. A custodial interrogation to which Section 3 otherwise applies need not
be recorded electronically if a law enforcement officer conducting the interrogation or the
officer’s superior reasonably believes that electronic recording would disclose the
identity of a confidential informant or jeopardize the safety of an officer, the individual
being interrogated, or another individual. If feasible and consistent with the safety of a
confidential informant, an explanation of the basis for the belief that electronic recording
would disclose the informant’s identity must be recorded electronically at the time of the
interrogation. If contemporaneous recording of the basis for the belief is not feasible, the
recording must be made as soon as practicable after the interrogation is completed.
SECTION 10. EXCEPTION FOR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION.
[(a)] All or part of a custodial interrogation to which Section 3 otherwise applies
need not be recorded electronically to the extent that recording is not feasible because the
available electronic recording equipment fails, despite reasonable maintenance of the
equipment, and timely repair or replacement is not feasible.
[(b) If both audio and video recording of a custodial interrogation are otherwise
required by Section 3, recording may be by audio alone if a technical problem in the
video recording equipment prevents video recording, despite reasonable maintenance of
the equipment, and timely repair or replacement is not feasible.]
[[(b)][(c)] If both audio and video recording of a custodial interrogation are
otherwise required by Section 3, recording may be by video alone if a technical problem
in the audio recording equipment prevents audio recording, despite reasonable
maintenance of the equipment, and timely repair or replacement is not feasible.]
Legislative Note: Subsections (b) or (c), or both, need to be considered only in a
state that chooses to mandate both audio and video recording in Section 3.
SECTION 11. BURDEN OF PERSUASION. If the prosecution relies on an
exception in Sections 5 through 10 to justify a failure to record electronically a custodial
interrogation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
exception applies.
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SECTION 12. NOTICE OF INTENT TO INTRODUCE UNRECORDED
STATEMENT. If the prosecution intends to introduce in its case in chief a statement
made during a custodial interrogation to which Section 3 applies which was not recorded
electronically, the prosecution, not later than the time specified by [insert citation to
statute or rule of procedure], shall serve the defendant with written notice of that intent
and of any exception on which the prosecution intends to rely.
Legislative Note: State statutes or rules of criminal procedure often specify a time
by which motions must be filed or notice given by the prosecution concerning the
production of certain evidence to the defense in advance of trial. Some of these statutes
or rules require prosecution notice even without defense action, as may be true for a
broad mandate to produce material exculpatory evidence or to identify prior act
witnesses. It is this class of rule or statute that Section 12 contemplates. Section 12 leaves
it to each state to identify the precise controlling statute or rule, rather than specifying a
single time period to control in every state.
SECTION 13. PROCEDURAL REMEDIES.
(a) Unless the court finds that an exception in Sections 5 through 10 applies, the
court shall consider the failure to record electronically all or part of a custodial
interrogation to which Section 3 applies [as a factor] in determining whether a statement
made during the interrogation is admissible, including whether it was voluntarily made
[or is reliable].
(b) If the court admits into evidence a statement made during a custodial
interrogation that was not recorded electronically in compliance with Section 3, the court,
on request of the defendant, shall give a cautionary instruction to the jury.
SECTION 14. HANDLING AND PRESERVING ELECTRONIC RECORDING.
Each law enforcement agency in this state shall establish and enforce procedures to
ensure that the electronic recording of all or part of a custodial interrogation is identified,
accessible, and preserved as required by [cites statutes, court rules, or other state
authority generally governing the method of preserving evidence in criminal cases].
SECTION 15. RULES relating to ELECTRONIC RECORDING.
Alternative A
(a) Each law enforcement agency that is a governmental entity of this state shall
adopt and enforce rules to implement this [act].
Alternative B
(a) [insert name of the appropriate state authority] shall adopt rules to implement
this [act] which each law enforcement agency that is a governmental entity of this state
shall enforce.
Alternative C
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(a) [insert name of the state agency charged with monitoring law enforcement's
compliance with this act] shall adopt rules to implement this [act] and monitor
enforcement of the rules by each law enforcement agency that is a governmental entity of
this state.
End of Alternatives
(b) The rules adopted under subsection (a) must address the following topics:
(1) how an electronic recording of a custodial interrogation must be made;
(2) the collection and review of electronic recordings, or the absence
thereof, by supervisors in [the] [each] law enforcement agency;
(3) the assignment of supervisory responsibilities and a chain of command
to promote internal accountability;
(4) a process for explaining noncompliance with procedures and imposing
administrative sanctions for a failure to comply that is not justified;
(5) a supervisory system expressly imposing on individuals in specific
positions a duty to ensure adequate staffing, education, training, and material
resources to implement this [act]; [and]
(6) a process for monitoring the chain of custody of an electronic recording;
and
(7) [insert other topic].
[(c) The rules adopted under subsection (b)(1) for video recording must contain
standards for the angle, focus, and field of vision of a recording device which reasonably
promote accurate recording of a custodial interrogation [at a place of detention] and
reliable assessment of its accuracy and completeness.]
[[(c)][(d)] Each law enforcement agency that is a governmental entity in this state
shall adopt and enforce rules providing for administrative discipline of a law enforcement
officer found by a court or the agency to have violated this [act]. [The rules must provide
a range of disciplinary sanctions reasonably designed to promote compliance with this
[act].]]
Legislative Note: Subsection (a) offers three alternatives. The first alternative
requires each local and state law enforcement agency to draft its own rules. The second
alternative leaves it to a single state authority to draft rules to govern all state and local
law enforcement agencies, though that single state authority is assigned no obligations
relevant to this act other than drafting the rules. The third alternative assigns the ruledrafting task to a new or existing agency that is assigned an additional responsibility,
that is, monitoring all state and local law enforcement agencies’ compliance with the
terms of this Act. The third alternative thus differs from the second in that the specified
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agency would have both rule-drafting and act-implementation monitoring
responsibilities, but the intention would still be that that agency would draft rules meant
to govern all state and local law enforcement. Subsection (b)(7) is bracketed, applying if
a jurisdiction chooses to add to the topics that the rules discussed in subsection (b) must
address. Subsection (c) is necessary only in a jurisdiction that requires both audio and
video recording under subsection 3 (a). In collective bargaining states, subsection (d)
would not apply. Instead, the matter would be controlled by collective bargaining
agreements. Thus subsection (d) is bracketed.
SECTION 16. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.
(a) A law enforcement agency that is a governmental entity in this state which has
implemented procedures reasonably designed to enforce the rules adopted pursuant to
Section 15 and ensure compliance with this [act] is not subject to civil liability for
damages arising from a violation of this [act].
(b) This [act] does not create a right of action against a law enforcement officer.
SECTION 17. SELF-AUTHENTICATION.
(a) In any pretrial or post trial proceeding, an electronic recording of a custodial
interrogation is self-authenticating if it is accompanied by a certificate of authenticity
sworn under oath or affirmation by an appropriate law enforcement officer.
(b) This [act] does not limit the right of an individual to challenge the authenticity
of an electronic recording of a custodial interrogation under law of this state other than
this [act].
SECTION 18. NO RIGHT TO ELECTRONIC RECORDING OR TRANSCRIPT.
(a) This [act] does not create a right of an individual to require a custodial
interrogation to be recorded electronically.
(b) This [act] does not require preparation of a transcript of an electronic recording
of a custodial interrogation.
SECTION 19. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION. In
applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to
promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
SECTION 20. RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND
NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT. This [act] modifies, limits, and supersedes the
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et
seq., but does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 7001(c), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in
Section 103(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7003(b).
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[SECTION 21. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this [act] or its application to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions
or applications of this [act] which can be given effect without the invalid provision or
application, and to this end the provisions of this [act] are severable.]
Legislative Note: Include this section only if this state lacks a general severability
statute or a decision by the highest court of this state stating a general rule of
severability.
SECTION 22. REPEALS. The following are repealed:
(1)……………….
(2)……………….
(3)……………….
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